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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the mass prophylaxis following a bioterrorist attack is to 
reduce fear within the community and to reduce loss of life to the disease. 
Current U.S. government guidance provided by the Department of Health and 
Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for response 
to an anthrax attack states that the optimal amount of time for distribution of 
prophylaxis to the community is two days. Yet, how can the public health 
agencies of a state dispense antibiotics to everyone in a large metropolitan area 
within forty-eight hours of potential exposure?  
A key challenge to a successful mass prophylaxis campaign is staffing the 
functions required to receive, stage, transport, deliver, and dispense antibiotics. 
Is there value in developing relationships with large corporations within the 
metropolitan area to support their active involvement as reliable, effective, and 
efficient volunteer entities for dispensing pharmaceuticals following a terrorist 
incident or natural disaster? This thesis evaluates the novel approach of inviting 
corporations to act as volunteer entities in and of themselves (rather than merely 
offering their facilities for use to support a government activity) as well as more 
traditional options such as utilizing the current public health force (supported by 
traditional volunteer recruitment) and using the United States Postal Service to 
directly deliver medication to households. A fourth option, combining the first 
three options to meet the requirements of timely delivery, security, medical 
personnel support, nonmedical personnel support, and client information 
collection is also considered. 
Any strategic option for distributing prophylaxis should address the 
following fundamental questions: 
• Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? 
• Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? 
• Does the option increase the number of people who can be served 
within a given timeframe? 
 vi
• Does the option increase the availability of medical care providers 
to support screening and dispensing? 
• Does the option reduce security personnel requirements? 
• Does the option support gathering needed information about the 
people who receive the medication? 
• Does the option provide redress for clients in the event of an 
adverse medication side effect? 
• Does the option require new legislation or changes to existing 
legislation?  
• Does the option increase the availability of nonmedical support 
personnel for dispensing activities? 
The thesis compares the four primary strategic options based on how well 
they address each of these fundamental questions. This thesis provides informed 
consideration of policy options for community leaders who are addressing the 
need to rapidly dispense medications, based on combining public and private 
resources to meet the needs of the community. 
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A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of mass prophylaxis is to ease fear within the community 
following a bioterrorist attack and to reduce loss of life to the disease. The current 
planning guidance provided to state public health agencies by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) for responding to an attack establishes the amount of time for optimal use 
of mass prophylaxis for anthrax as two days. Can state public health agencies 
dispense antibiotics to all residents of a large metropolitan area within forty-eight 
hours of potential exposure? With an estimated population of 4.8 million people 
in the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), local public health agencies 
within the MSA must collectively treat more than 100,000 persons every hour.1 
To meet the dispensing requirement, public health agencies must minimize the 
time needed to receive, stage, transport, deliver, and dispense antibiotics.  
As the four actions framework depicted in Figure 1.1 illustrates, state and 
local public health agencies must consider what actions will effectively change 
the delivery of antibiotics in response to a terrorist use of anthrax as a biological 
agent. The actions taken to support Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) 
operations must achieve strategic change in community support, reduce fear, 
and build more confidence in the disaster response ability to save more lives, in 
part by eliminating the uncertainty that currently exists in the support for 
dispensing site operations. The public health organizations need to assist in the 
creation of greater community ownership of both the problem and the solution, as 
well as to clearly identify the resources within the community to support further 
preparedness and response. To prepare to better respond, local public health 
officials and the community must increase general awareness of the issues 
involved and encourage participation by nontraditional partner groups. 
                                            
1 This estimate assumes 24-hour dispensing site operations. The numbers of personnel 
required are even greater if the hours of operation are decreased. 
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Figure 1.1 A Four Actions Framework for Dispensing Site Operations (After 
Kim and Mauborgne)2 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed the strategic dynamic of the nation’s 
approach to homeland security. The anthrax attacks that followed in October 
2001 identified key issues of public health preparedness and effective response 
to bioterrorism. As a result, the CDC suddenly found itself at the forefront of 
homeland security concerns. Although much federal, state, and local planning 
and emphasis have been placed on the SNS, the SNS program does not have 
assigned assets to distribute or dispense supplies in response to a bioterrorism 
event. Therefore, the distribution and dispensing of supplies in response to the 
continued threat of a bioterrorism attack remains problematic.  
The CDC has delegated the distribution responsibilities associated with 
the stockpile of supplies to the state public health and emergency management 
agencies. Within the states, the responsibility for the planning and preparation for 
                                            
2 The idea for this representation of a Network-Centric Response Curve is taken from W. 
Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2005). 
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3 
mass prophylaxis dispensing falls to local public health departments, emergency 
management, and law enforcement agencies. Within their normal operating 
parameters, these local elements possess neither the assets nor the capacity to 
meet the full requirement. Essentially, there is a gap between the dispensing 
strategies envisioned by the federal and state governments and the actual local 
ability to rapidly dispense supplies for a mass prophylaxis effort. Flawed 
expectations, poor management, and ineffective response plans have resulted in 
the federal, state, and local governments’ collective inability to adequately 
address this gap. 
The CDC Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) is intended to 
respond quickly to assist any community reacting to a successful terrorist release 
of a biological agent in an attack upon a metropolitan area in the United States. 
Within twelve hours of the federal government’s determination that the situation 
warrants this support, the DSNS will respond by deploying the assets of the SNS 
(i.e., antibiotics and other medical supplies), accompanied by a small team of 
logistics specialists called the Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU). The 
TARU will assist the Receiving, Storing, and Staging (RSS) site personnel with 
technical support. Using push packs of seven or eight fifty-three-foot tractor 
trailers, each holding about fifty tons of supplies, the SNS program provides 
pharmaceutical and limited medical supply support to the requesting state. The 
DSNS does not, however, provide dispensing team personnel, facilities, or 
transportation support beyond the delivery of the supplies to a state-identified 
receiving site.3 
When the push pack arrives at the state’s designated RSS site, a 
designated, qualified representative of the state will sign for the push pack. At 
that time, the contents of the push pack become state assets. State and local 
personnel assigned to emergency response duties at the RSS site organize the 
supplies into packages for use by local dispensing sites, sometimes referred to 
                                            
3 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets, A Guide 
for Preparedness, Version 10.02—Draft, Atlanta, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
(August 2006).  
4 
as points of dispensing (PODs). From the dispensing sites, public health 
employees and their volunteer assistants provide antibiotics to the community. 
As previously mentioned, the current CDC dispensing guidance for anthrax 
recommends providing the antibiotics to the potentially exposed population within 
forty-eight hours of the initial detection and identification of the agent. Completing 
the mass prophylaxis within this forty-eight-hour window will achieve optimum 
benefit of post-exposure prophylaxis among those people who have inhaled 
anthrax spores.4 
To address the need for rapid mass prophylaxis throughout a large 
metropolitan area, CDC implemented the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) in 
selected cities.5 The CRI, which is a component of the CDC’s SNS program, was 
developed to add support for the planning and preparation for dispensing 
antibiotics to an entire metropolitan area within forty-eight hours. Since October 
2001, state and local public health agencies have been working with the CDC 
SNS planners to improve the capacity and capability to quickly and efficiently 
distribute pharmaceutical supplies and to dispense antibiotics to large numbers 
of people. Initially, these planning efforts focused on smallpox vaccination clinics. 
The guidance provided for response to a smallpox release recommended that 
vaccination clinics conclude treatment of affected communities within three to five 
days. For planning purposes, the size of the population to be vaccinated was 
tempered by consideration of a ring vaccination plan looking to reach contacts of 
contacts. Immediate vaccination of the entire population of a metropolitan area 
was not considered as part of this initial SNS planning. 
                                            
4 Dena M. Bravata, Gregory S. Zaric, Jon-Erik C. Holty, Margaret L. Brandeau, Emilee R. 
Wilhelm, Kathryn M. McDonald, and Douglas K. Owens, “Reducing Mortality from Anthrax 
Bioterrorism: Strategies for Stockpiling and Dispensing Medical and Pharmaceutical Supplies,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, no. 3 (2006): 253–
254. 
5 U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Cities Readiness Initiative: Q&A about the Cities Readiness Initiative Pilot Program, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cri/qa.asp (accessed June 3, 2006). This program has since been 
expanded to include additional metropolitan areas and now covers at least one metropolitan area 
in each state.  
5 
The CDC and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) now consider 
an event involving anthrax as the worst-case scenario for prophylaxis 
requirements. Federal, state, and private organizations have purchased and 
deployed a variety of environmental sampling systems and automated biological 
agent detection systems throughout the country.6 Some of these systems focus 
on anthrax alone. Others allow for testing for a wide variety of agents. State and 
local public health organizations, with their laboratory networks and mass 
dispensing expertise, have been approached as planning partners for response 
to any positive test results or alarms from these systems. As the medical and 
public health disciplines have developed a better understanding of anthrax, they 
have realized that to save the greatest possible number of lives the timeline for 
distribution and dispensing of medication must be shorter than had been planned 
for smallpox. Public health response planners must plan for dispensing 
prophylaxis to more people in less time than that recommended for smallpox 
vaccinations.7 The clock on the forty-eight-hour deadline begins with the first 
identification of the agent, regardless of the circumstances in which that 
identification might occur. 
The timeline established for response to an anthrax incident has put new 
pressures on the local dispensing site efforts. Much has been accomplished by 
the states in preparation for receiving and staging the supplies available through 
the SNS. Primary and alternate RSS sites have been identified. Key staff have 
been identified and trained. Now the planning and preparation focus has shifted 
from the RSS sites to the dispensing sites. The timely activation and staffing of 
the dispensing sites by local public health organizations requires many readily 
available and prepared personnel to support the receiving and dispensing sites. 
This is a major obstacle in meeting the expectation of 100 percent prophylaxis of 
a city’s population within the designated time. 
                                            
6 Examples include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security BioWatch and the United 
States Postal Service Biohazard Detection System.  
7 Bravata et al., “Reducing Mortality,” 245. 
6 
The staffing required for receiving and distributing the stockpile from the 
RSS site is small compared to the number of staff required to conduct mass 
prophylaxis dispensing site operations. The CDC guidance for dispensing site 
operations suggests that the metropolitan public health agencies may have to 
train thousands of people to meet the key dispensing site personnel needs.8 This 
increased support requirement clearly places a greatly increased burden on local 
public health, medical, and emergency management personnel as they plan for 
dispensing medication to large numbers of possibly exposed people. 
A compounding issue for dispensing site planners is the requirement that 
medical professionals directly supervise the dispensing of medication. This 
requirement for people with specialized skills varies from state to state, as state 
laws concerning emergency response and pharmaceutical dispensing differ. 
Changes in legislation may ease this burden, but current planning measures 
must consider this limiting issue, particularly given that public health is competing 
with other agencies and organizations seeking specialized, qualified support. 
While volunteers are needed for the distribution and dispensing sites, hospitals 
and medical clinics will likely need clinical professionals to support the increased 
tempo of operations their facilities will experience as more patients seek either 
preventive treatment or care for an illness related to the possible biological 
attack. With estimates for the number of volunteers needed within metropolitan 
areas ranging into the tens of thousands to assist in the operation of dispensing 
sites,9 new alternative volunteer resources must be considered for public health 
to meet the need for a quick, safe, and efficient response. 
Consideration must also be given to locating facilities and transportation 
support. The CDC guidance indicates that identifying well known and easily 
accessible locations is another important part of the planning effort that supports 
speedy delivery of the medication. During CDC DSNS technical assessment 
                                            
8 CDC, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing, 12-22. 
9 The author has engaged in multiple discussions with local public health officials within the 
Atlanta metropolitan statistical area, which indicate great concern with the number of volunteers 
required to achieve a throughput adequate to reach 100 percent of the community within forty-
eight hours. 
7 
visits, identifying transportation support and resources for the dispensing sites 
also surfaced as an issue for the supported state and local public health 
agencies.10 
Despite all of this attention, there are local resources that have yet to be 
considered fully. Community partners, including major businesses, may help fill 
the gap. In particular, what role can large businesses play in mass prophylaxis? 
Large businesses have substantial numbers of employees, facilities, and other 
essential resources that are pre-positioned within potentially affected 
communities. Is there value in developing relationships with large corporations 
within the metropolitan area to support their active involvement as reliable, 
effective, and efficient volunteer entities in the effort to dispense pharmaceuticals 
following a terrorist incident or natural disaster? 
The process chart in Figure 1.2 provides a summary view of the activities 
that must be accomplished prior to a community conducting dispensing site 
operations with DSNS support. It serves as a primer for discussions concerning 
mass prophylaxis planning and response. It also shows the division of 
responsibilities: the state focus is on distribution to identified dispensing sites, 
while the local focus is on the dispensing of antibiotics.  
Figure 1.2 clearly demonstrates the need for planning, asset identification, 
and resolution of implementation conflicts among multiple agencies. With the 
goal of 100 percent prophylaxis within forty-eight hours, coordination and 
collaboration among the agencies is crucial to success. For a large metropolitan 
area, the coordinated use of every resource available will be necessary. 
                                            
10 Taken from author’s notes and post–site visit reports for the eighteen health districts in 
Georgia, conference discussions among representatives of the CDC, State SNS Coordinators 




Figure 1.2 Summary of Dispensing Site Process 
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9 
the four options being considered at this time. Chapter V addresses 
implementation hurdles, policy implications of the findings, and possible further 
investigations into solutions for rapid dispensing. 
D. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
An examination of the current research suggests that great effort has gone 
into searching for solutions to the challenge of providing support to the 
communities in detecting and responding to a bioterrorist event. However, how 
best to access and maintain large numbers and types of volunteers has not been 
fully addressed. Volunteers are critical to successful dispensing of medication to 
the full population of a metropolitan area when given a very short timeline. 
Following the attacks of September 2001, studies and workshops were 
conducted to address the government’s pursuit of more nongovernmental 
organizations to assist in meeting the requirements for response to the terrorist 
threat.11 Other studies recommended public-private collaboration in technology 
and services, such as laboratory networks, surveillance systems, and critical 
infrastructure protection.12 The call for collaboration between business and 
government was extended not only to private businesses, but also to nonprofit 
organizations to determine how best to meet the response needs.13 These 
documents provided a new emphasis for developing public-private partnerships, 
which will be explored as part of this thesis. 
Preparations for distribution and dispensing of medication by public health 
and emergency management agencies began well before the terrorist attacks of 
2001. For example, the unclassified abstract of Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 62, signed and released for general planning purposes in 1998, stated 
that the Public Health Service would be the lead federal agency for planning, 
                                            
11 Charles P. Connelly, “The Role of Private Security in Combating Terrorism” (Presentation 
given at the Major Cities Chiefs/National Executive Institute's Annual Conference, Sun Valley, 
Idaho, June 2003), http://www.neiassociates.org/privatesecurity.htm (accessed June 10, 2006). 
12 R. Scott Fosler, Changing Roles, Changing Relationships: The New Challenge for 
Business, Nonprofit Organizations, and Government (New York, NY: The Three Sector Initiative, 
2002). 
13 R. Scott Fosler, Working Better Together: How Government, Business, and Nonprofit 
Organizations Can Achieve Public Purposes Through Cross Sector Collaboration, Alliances, and 
Partnerships (New York, NY: The Three Sector Initiative, 2002).  
10 
preparing, and responding to medical emergencies related to the use of weapons 
of mass destruction. The responsibilities associated with this directive included 
stockpiling various pharmaceutical supplies needed for response to a disaster.14 
This was the beginning of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, now known as 
the Strategic National Stockpile. 
In 2002, the CDC, in its Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public 
Health Preparedness (the mechanism that CDC uses to fund state public health 
preparedness programs), required each of the participating states and territories 
to develop a plan for rapid receipt and distribution of the contents.15 The initial 
CDC efforts focused on the delivery to and receipt by the states. Planning by the 
states emphasized the activities at the RSS sites. Some states also developed 
plans for distribution hubs as intermediate sites between the RSS and the 
dispensing sites16. Evaluations of state preparedness completed by the CDC 
(now referred to as technical reviews) addressed the capability of the state to 
receive the stockpile. A state was declared “green” when the evaluations 
indicated that the state was reasonably capable of opening a warehouse, 
unloading several freight trucks, and aligning the contents to support local 
redistribution in a timely manner. The evaluations now look at the ability to 
conduct RSS site and dispensing operations. The CDC assessment reports from 
November 2004 noted that identifying and training personnel for staffing the 
dispensing sites in adequate numbers was a problem.17 These evaluations have  
 
                                            
14 "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," 
Presidential Decision Directive 62 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 22, 1998). 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps9890/lps9890/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps/lib_pdd62.htm 
(accessed June 10, 2006). 
15 U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2002 Critical Benchmarks (by Focus Area), 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/pdf/appendix-8.pdf (accessed June 10, 
2006). 
16 Author’s discussions with DSNS consultants assigned to Georgia, October 2006. 
17 U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, CDC Strategic National Stockpile CRI Baseline Assessment Report (DRAFT). 
Prepared for the Atlanta Metropolitan Area, November 14, 2004.  
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been used by the Trust for America’s Health, a health advocacy organization that 
works to keep health issues as a national priority, supporting reviews that are 
critical of overall public health preparedness assessments of the states.18 
Research addressing the support of delivery or dispensing of the 
stockpiled antibiotics to people who will actually need the medication is relatively 
small, but growing. State and local planners are guarded when discussing RSS 
site support, and only slightly less so when talking about the dispensing sites, for 
fear of inadvertently disclosing the planned location of the RSS site.19 In an 
article published on the web site of the National Association of City and County 
Health Officials, however, Patrick Lindner, of the Kansas City, Missouri, Health 
Department, has offered examples of CRI dispensing alternatives that have been 
considered by communities and states and, in some cases, evaluated through 
tabletop exercises and other drills.20 
Literature prepared by schools of public health and by SNS planners 
addresses various aspects of throughput models that support the requirement for 
the large numbers of workers needed at dispensing sites to treat the 
recommended number of people within the allotted time. Work by Weill Medical 
College of Cornell University has given rise to concerns about the size of the 
facilities and the number of staff that would be required to support the level of  
 
 
                                            
18 Trust for America’s Health, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health from Disease, 
Disasters, and Bioterrorism, 2006, 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror06/BioTerrorReport2006.pdf (accessed January 7, 
2007). 
19 Interviews and discussions conducted by the author with SNS planners within the Atlanta 
Metropolitan Statistical Area, August 2006 through November 2007. 
20 Patrick J. Lindner, CRI Alternative Dispensing Guide: A Collection of Model Practices and 
Pilot Projects (National Association of City and County Health Officials, 2006), 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/documents/AlternativeDispensingGuide_Final_000.pdf 
(accessed December 23, 2006). 
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throughput desired by CDC.21 As with most models, Weill’s method does not 
apply directly to every situation, and while the equations offered have general 
application, they must be adjusted for specific sites. 
Some studies have investigated volunteer motivation and recent surveys 
have also looked at public health and medical professionals’ willingness to work 
during response to a biological attack or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Most of 
these studies raise concerns that there will be resistance among those who feel 
the importance of their daily work exceeds the importance of devoting time for 
emergency preparedness. The literature also raises concerns about the 
reluctance of employees to participate in response activities unless they think 
that the duties they will perform are important enough to warrant the level of 
danger they might face. Some workers are concerned about the safety of family 
members and some are concerned for their own safety.22 
Similarly, literature is available addressing recent efforts to form 
partnerships between the government and private corporations to meet the gaps 
between the capabilities and capacities of the two groups. Some literature 
focused on the business perspective, addressing the actions that businesses 
should take to prepare for a possible terrorist incident.23 Others, such as a study 
by the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh, have noted legal 
concerns that need to be addressed to further optimum participation by 
                                            
21 Nathaniel Hupert, Jason Cuomo, Mark A. Callahan, Alvin I. Mushlin, and Stephen S. 
Morse, “Community-Based Mass Prophylaxis: A Planning Guide for Public Health Preparedness,” 
(Ithaca, NY: Weill Medical College of Cornell University, Department of Public Health, August 
2004). http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/biotertools/cbmprophyl.doc (accessed January 7, 
2006). 
22 Ran D. Balicer, Saad D. Omer, Daniel J. Barnett, and George S. Everly, Jr. “Local Public 
Health Workers' Perceptions toward Responding to an Influenza Pandemic,” BMC Public Health 
6 (2006): 99, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99 (accessed December 28, 2006). 
23 Business Executives for National Security Metro Atlanta Region, Getting Ready: Company 
Primer on Preparedness and Response Planning for Terrorist and Bioterrorist Attacks (Atlanta, 
GA: Business Executives for National Security,  
http://www.bens.org/images/GettingReady_042304.pdf (accessed December 27, 2006). 
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businesses.24 There is current CDC documentation that instructs local and state 
public health to seek out private business as partners in the dispensing effort. 
In Georgia, an alliance between the state Division of Public Health and the 
Business Executives for National Security (BENS) developed in the spring of 
2001. The Atlanta chapter of BENS initially partnered with CDC, the Georgia 
Division of Public Health, and the DeKalb County Health Department looking for 
ways larger businesses can support the disaster preparedness of smaller 
businesses in the face of the emerging terrorist threat. The first product of that 
partnership was a primer for business preparation for disasters, specifically a 
terrorist incident involving the use of a biological agent. Since 2003, the planning 
has expanded to review ways public health and business might work together to 
cover gaps in preparedness. Support of the SNS activities became one of the 
focal points for investigation. The concepts there have moved beyond the proof-
of-concept level to preparations for multiple health district exercises to test the 
plans for corporate volunteer support of public health activities. These concepts 
will form the basis of the discussion in Chapters III and IV.25  
The public health response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and 
September 2005 raised new concerns about the SNS support. These concerns 
add emphasis to the need to find new ways to meet the resource requirements 
for receiving and dispensing medication as a part of emergency response 
activities. Many of the organizations and locations that state and local public 
health agencies had planned to use were no longer available, while the pool of 
individual volunteers from local communities was depleted by evacuation. 
Most of the concerns raised by the hurricane response are outside the 
scope of this investigation, however. After-action reports of SNS deployments as 
                                            
24 Onora Lien, Beth Maldin Crystal Franko, and Gigi Kwik Gronvall, “Getting Medicine to 
Millions: New Strategies for Mass Distribution,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice and Science 4, No. 2 (2006), 176–182,  
http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.176?cookieSet=1 (accessed January 
12, 2007). 
25 James W. Buehler, Ellen A. Whitney, and Ruth Berkelman, “Business and Public Health 
Collaboration for Emergency Preparedness in Georgia: a Case Study,” BMC Public Health 6 
(2006): 285, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/285 (accessed January 7, 2007). 
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part of the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the testimony before 
Congress concerning the public health response for those two events, address a 
different dispensing requirement than that which public health expects to face 
following a terrorist event. There was no need for rapid dispensing of antibiotics. 
There was no critical need for ventilators. There was, however, a need to support 
the kinds of medications that out-patients would have purchased at a local 
pharmacy. The need to support maintenance medications differs greatly from the 
immediate need for antibiotics following an anthrax release. 
Even so, reports like those published by the Trust for America’s Health 
based on the reported success of SNS response and describing the experience 
in Mississippi, may bolster the belief that the stockpile can be delivered quickly 
and efficiently using public health assets. Reports concerning events in 
Louisiana, however, indicate some difficulties for the response, as the locations 
for the RSS site and planned dispensing sites had to be significantly altered 
during the response.26  
On a positive note, in both Mississippi and Louisiana the local, state, and 
federal responders reported they were able to adapt to the circumstances they 
faced.27 Essentially, multiple locations for dispensing sites and multiple sources 
of volunteer support must be coordinated for the response. The use of the 
locations must be coordinated through local and state emergency management 
to resolve the conflicts created by multiple agencies wanting to use the same 
property. These are lessons that will apply to any SNS deployment. 
Part of the hurricane experience pointed to the inadequacy of planning 
without identifying multiple contingency sites for an event that destroys the 
largest base of volunteer support within the state. Importantly, the multiple 
demands for volunteers, and the inaccessibility of the region, affected the speed 
with which support could be delivered. Difficulties included the inability of 
                                            
26 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (February 
2006), 48–49, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (accessed June 10, 
2006).  
27 Author’s discussions with state public health officials from Louisiana and Mississippi, 
December 1–2, 2005. 
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traditional volunteer recruiting organizations, such as Red Cross and other 
volunteer organizations active in disasters (VOADs), to deploy volunteers and 
establish effective recruiting methods to meet the needs of response to a 
catastrophic event. 
 The administrative requirements to recruit, train, and credential individual 
volunteers are daunting. This is exacerbated by the required number of 
volunteers, which may be in the thousands according to the CDC SNS guidance. 
Similarly, the multiple alternate facilities and transportation support needed must 
be coordinated prior to an event in order to efficiently support the delivery of 
pharmaceuticals during the emergency response. 
E. METHOD 
This investigation considers policy options for officials charged with the 
health and welfare of their communities who must plan for mass prophylaxis. In 
Blue Ocean Strategy, W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne introduce a business 
strategy that is built upon risk minimization rather than risk taking.28 Among the 
tools that they have developed is the strategy canvas, which serves as the 
analytical framework for evaluating strategic options. The canvas allows the 
current status of activities to be captured against a range of factors associated 
with performance within a given industry. The information can be shown in 
graphic form with points plotted for the selected option’s performance. 
Connecting the points provides a value curve, the basic component of the 
strategy canvas. The curve is a graphic depiction of relative performance across 
the selected factors.29 Using a strategy canvas modified for analysis of SNS 
support operations in dispensing antibiotics, value curves will be developed for 
each of the policy options being reviewed. 
Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of government and private 
corporation partnerships can provide basic conclusions on the feasibility of 
calling on private companies to augment the government’s public health 
workforce. This is particularly true of the community response needs during a 
                                            
28 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 23. 
29 Ibid., 25–28. 
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disaster that requires SNS deployment.  This analysis weighs the requirements 
for support against the resources that could be gained through this partnership. 
The analysis also considers legal obstacles to implementation of these 
partnerships. The investigation reviews the impact of current state and local laws 
governing the dispensing of the kinds of medications that are included in the SNS 
and laws addressing liability of volunteers. The study also considers the level of 
public awareness required to adequately implement this and any other option. 
This investigation provides evidence for assessing the value of involving 
corporations as volunteer entities to provide personnel, facilities, and 
transportation resources to assist in the quick delivery of medications to the 
community. This thesis provides informed consideration of a policy option, for 
community leaders who are addressing the need to rapidly dispense 
medications, of combining public and private resources to meet the needs of the 
community. 
The practical aspects of this investigation will support alternative solutions 
to an immediate problem, helping to close the gap between the support needed 
to dispense the contents of the SNS in a timely manner and the reality of the 
staffing, facility, and transportation shortfalls that have been identified for 
dispensing sites. In particular, this thesis examines possible solutions for Atlanta 
and Georgia and considers whether they could serve as a model for other CRI-
designated metropolitan areas and all states. A critical assessment of an option 
that includes using businesses as volunteer entities supporting dispensing 
operations could assist both state and local planners seeking to meet the 
benchmarks established by both CDC and DHS for the delivery of medications 
and, more importantly, save lives. 
The thesis proposes a novel approach of inviting corporations as volunteer 
entities, not merely offering their facilities for use to support a government 




• Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? 
• Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? 
• Does the option increase the number of people who can be served 
within a given timeframe? 
• Does the option enhance the availability of medical care providers 
to support screening and dispensing? 
• Does the option reduce the security personnel requirements? 
• Does the option support gathering needed information about the 
people who receive the medication? 
• Does the option provide redress for the clients in the event of an 
adverse medication side effect? 
• Does the option require new legislation or changes to existing 
legislation?  
• Does the option enhance the availability of non-medical support 
personnel for dispensing activities?  
The thesis compares strategic options that answer each of these 
fundamental questions. The four primary strategic options are (1) using the 
current public health force supported by traditional volunteer recruitment, (2) 
using the United States Postal Service to directly deliver medication to 
households, (3) recruiting large businesses to serve as volunteer entities, and (4) 
a possible combination of the three options to meet the requirements of timely 
delivery, security, medical personnel support, non-medical personnel support, 
and client information collection. Within all four options, the discussion also 
focuses on whether new legislation is needed to cover pharmaceutical 
dispensing authorities, corporate liability, and indemnity. Interviews with SNS 
coordinators, emergency managers, and business representatives (both owners 
and operations managers) will support or refute the concept of corporate support 
as acceptable for further exploration. 
In summary, four options are considered as solutions to the problem of 
dispensing rapidly to 100 percent of the population of a large metropolitan area. 
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II. STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND CITIES 
READINESS INITIATIVE 
This chapter provides a review of the guidance and direction provided by 
CDC for state and local planners. An understanding of the gap between the 
guidance provided to the planners and the realities that they face is necessary for 
a better understanding of the problems planners are attempting to solve. The 
assessments and decisions made by local officials are shaped by their 
understanding of the threat, the response capacity of internal and external 
resources, and the readiness of the responders within the community. 
Recommendations for state and local public health preparation for significant 
medical and pharmaceutical disaster support are found in the CDC’s guide for 
preparedness for receiving the SNS. The guidance document is revised 
continuously, and is available in draft version 10.02 at this writing.30 
A. CURRENT CDC GUIDANCE FOR STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE SNS 
Based on Version 10.02 of the CDC guidance, states are expected to 
receive supplies at a central facility and then further distribute the supplies to 
points of dispensing or to intermediate nodes for further repackaging for 
distribution to other dispensing sites. CDC requirements include personnel, 
facilities, communications equipment, coordination and control procedures, 
organizational frameworks, and transportation assets. The responsibilities for 
personnel at the dispensing site include establishing the site to support mass 
dispensing, receiving supplies from the RSS site and preparing for dispensing 
the antibiotics, screening individuals seeking medication, ensuring the safety of 
both the workers and those seeking assistance, managing the inventory provided 
from the RSS and documenting the dispensing site activities, and actually 
dispensing antibiotics or providing vaccinations.31 The guidelines established by 
CDC are very detailed and offer several methodologies for achieving successful  
 
                                            
30 CDC, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing.  
31 Ibid. Chapter 12 addresses dispensing site operations in detail. 
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prophylaxis of the community. However, the requirements for meeting the 
demands of the guidelines fall upon the local and state governments for 
coordination and implementation. 
CDC assigns contract consultants to work with each state and its local 
SNS planners. An alternate consultant is assigned to each state to support the 
primary consultant. The consultants provide interpretation of guidelines, conduct 
technical reviews of preparation, and make recommendations for improvements 
in planning. In interpreting the guidelines, the consultants attempt to maintain 
consistency throughout the supported states. This is to ensure the best possible 
methods are being considered and to prevent the preferential treatment of one 
section of a multi-state region, state, or community. 
The guidelines for post-exposure prophylaxis following an anthrax attack 
recommend providing treatment first for emergency responders and the medical 
community. Also, those assisting with activities at the dispensing sites should be 
included in the early treatment. The CDC strongly recommends that all 
dispensing sites within a community be opened simultaneously to avoid panic or 
the perception that one part of a community is being given preferential treatment 
(apart from preferences that have been discussed openly within the community, 
such as early treatment for first responders).32 This creates a significant 
requirement for personnel and facilities to be available quickly for the initial 
activities needed to establish an operational dispensing site. 
The stockpile may include new drugs that have not yet been fully 
approved for release except under investigational processes. The current 
guidance states, “You will have to administer amoxicillin under an Investigational 
New Drug (IND) Application, which requires that you obtain signed informed-
consent forms from recipients and that you monitor those recipients for adverse 
reactions.”33 This creates a dilemma for the strongly recommended option of 
dispensing supported by the USPS, which does not involve direct contact with 
                                            
32 CDC, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing. 12-30. 
33 Ibid., 9-7. 
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the people receiving the medication and fails to meet the requirements for 
monitoring. This problem will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters III and IV. 
B. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SNS AND CITIES 
READINESS INITIATIVE 
The CDC Cooperative Agreement “Program Announcement AA154” 
requires states that receive funding to agree to conduct mass prophylaxis 
planning and preparation to decrease the time needed to establish the RSS and 
dispensing sites.34 Inherent in this requirement is the necessity of implementing 
regional and state protocols for dispensing pharmaceutical support, meeting the 
guidelines found in the current version of the SNS guidance, ensuring the ability 
to conduct both mass vaccination and mass dispensing activities, and using 
information systems compliant with the Public Health Information Network 
Preparedness Functional Area Countermeasure and Response Administration 
(CRA).35 CRA addresses those information technology systems developed to 
manage and track actions taken to contain and counter an outbreak. 
The Cooperative Agreement “Announcement” also identifies a need to 
decrease the time required to provide protection or treatment to all responders, 
including nongovernmental support. Per the agreement, the CDC expects that 
states and local communities will work to decrease the time needed to develop 
and release coordinated information to the public through whatever incident 
command elements have been activated.36 To monitor the state’s progress within 
the SNS/CRI portion of the agreement, the state and local plans will be assessed 
through regular SNS/CRI reviews that will be conducted by the DSNS 
consultants. The methodology for the reviews has been under regular revision, 
but essentially is a listing of the requirements found in the SNS guidance. 
                                            
34 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, “Program Announcement AA154—2006 (Budget Year 7),” Cooperative Agreement 
Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/fy06announcement.pdf (accessed December 
23, 2006). 
35 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, “PHIN Countermeasures and Response Administration,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/PHIN/preparedness/cra.html (accessed February 9, 2007). 
36 CDC, “Program Announcement AA154—2006,” 4. 
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Other requirements for preparation for receiving the supplies from the 
SNS, found in the CDC Cooperative Agreement, outline planning and evaluation 
activities associated specifically with the selected metropolitan areas and the 
CRI, and requirements to address specific methods of response to include the 
USPS option. The CRI was established to provide additional support to 
metropolitan areas. Through the CRI, the CDC DSNS has increased the 
emphasis on large urban areas and is seeking to further enhance the capacity 
and capability of those communities for receiving and dispensing the SNS 
supplies.37 
C. RESOURCES 
Local personnel resources include public health staff and other 
government employees. They also include the personnel resources available 
through the regular volunteer methods employed by the Red Cross and other 
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (also referred to as VOADs). 
However, most government staffing is at levels required to support day-to-day 
operations with little surge capacity. Local facilities, such as schools, civic 
centers, and other municipal buildings may be available to support the 
dispensing effort, but access and central locations to various populations must be 
considered. Similarly, warehouses and large churches, synagogues, and 
mosques may be available. 
State and local government resources available to public health 
departments to assist it receiving and dispensing supplies from the stockpile are 
finite and, in many cases, very limited. States, responsible for dispensing as a 
local function, have found that it will be very difficult to meet the forty-eight-hour 
window using traditional delivery methods. Notification and movement of state 
employees, unless they are already within the affected jurisdiction, becomes 
problematic due to distances and traffic density within the metropolitan areas. 
Health care and medical care facilities are resources of great concern to 
CDC and public health during response to a terrorist event or a natural event 
such as pandemic influenza. The health care community would like to prevent a                                             
37 CDC, “Program Announcement AA154—2006,” 4. 
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large number of “worried well” or non–critically ill from overwhelming local 
hospitals and clinics. Members of the health care community are also concerned 
with protecting both the staff of the medical facilities and the families of the staff. 
Public health officials should seek the influence and leadership of elected 
and appointed officials early in the preparation and planning efforts, particularly 
with regards to available resources. They have great influence within the 
jurisdiction and can reach multiple agencies to garner support for the planning 
effort. They can reach the community in a variety of ways to encourage support 
by civic organizations, businesses, and individual volunteers. 
D. GUIDANCE MEETS REALITY 
Interviews conducted by the author during the spring and summer of 2006 
with state and local SNS coordinators, DSNS staff, members of the Directors of 
Public Health Preparedness Executive Committee, and state health officers 
indicate that the shortfalls in resources for conducting mass prophylaxis within 
the forty-eight hours set by current guidance occur in several key areas. The 
identification of sufficient personnel resources to actually support broad-based 
mass prophylaxis, adequate facility support, and adequate transportation are of 
particular note. These key shortfalls are seen in the areas that the DSNS staff 
emphasizes during technical assistance reviews. These shortfalls have also been 
noted in after-action reports of multiple exercises at the state and local level.38 
1. Personnel 
As communities strive to meet the mass dispensing requirements, the first 
of the shortfalls identified by local and state SNS planners is finding a stable and 
adequate source for the number of workers required to staff the dispensing 
sites.39 The lack of surge capacity among both the medical and non-medical 
personnel required to meet the needs of the planned dispensing sites, 
                                            
38 See for example the results of the 2004 East Central Health District SNS exercise and the 
Metro Atlanta SNS exercise of July 2005 that are held by the SNS Coordinator for the Georgia 
Division of Public Health. 
39 This identified shortfall is a regular item of discussion among the metropolitan Atlanta SNS 
planners during state and district conferences attended by the author. This same shortfall was 
noted in interviews with local planners conducted in October and December 2006 and January 
2007 as part of this investigation. 
24 
particularly for nurses and emergency medical support, is a part of that personnel 
shortfall. According to the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA), there is a moderate shortage of nurses nationwide, with varying levels 
of severity from community to community.40 That shortage is even greater among 
public health nurses, in part caused by a changing workplace in which greater 
demands are being made for training and preparation for emergency response.41 
Current expectations for participation, as seen in surveys conducted among 
public health staff, indicate that there is considerable reluctance among the staff 
to participate in a response to a bioterrorist incident.42 
Volunteer coordination has been a concern, from the initial planning 
stages, whenever volunteers were considered a necessary resource. 
Communications equipment, credentialing, and training have been additional 
problems confounding any organized response. The Medical Reserve Corps 
(MRC) has been used at the local level in several pilot activities throughout the 
country. Unfortunately, the funding has been limited for the communities 
establishing an MRC. The first communities to receive funding from federal 
grants now find themselves seeking new sources of funding.43 
Interviews and follow-on discussions with local public health planners 
working on the dispensing plans show the staffing requirements for the 
dispensing sites to be particularly vexing. A local planner from New York, from a 
jurisdiction adjacent to, but not a part of, the metropolitan area, stated that the 
planning effort had identified a need for 5,000 staff, but only 300 workers are 
available to fill the requirements. The alternatives being explored there now 
                                            
40 U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources, Health Resources and Services 
Administration, “HRSA nursing programs address the nation's registered nurse shortage,”  
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/nursing/ (accessed December 23, 2006). 
41 Interviews for this investigation, conducted during the spring, summer, and fall of 2006 
with Georgia district health directors and clinic coordinators in both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan health districts, support these claims as they strive to meet service delivery 
requirements. 
42 Balicer, et al.,”Local Public Health Workers' Perceptions.” 
43 Based on author’s notes from Georgia statewide MRC coordinator meetings during the 
past eighteen months indicating that funding, recruiting, and organization are the primary points 
of concern. 
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include allowing the first responders to conduct self-dispensing.44 A planner from 
the Atlanta MSA, using the guidance given by CDC and the Weill-Cornell 
planning model, reported that she had identified a requirement to treat 600,000 
persons in forty-eight hours. She has determined that this will require twenty 
dispensing sites with a minimum of two shifts of eighty-three workers at each site 
(3,320 personnel) to meet incident command and dispensing requirements. 
These numbers do not include personnel to meet security requirements for the 
dispensing site. She has identified approximately 800 potential volunteers from 
traditional resources, although a listing of names is not available.45 
2. Facilities 
Most local jurisdictions have developed plans that use schools as 
dispensing points. These locations were chosen because CDC consultants 
initially gave a strong recommendation for the use of schools, assuming that 
schools would provide a standard layout for dispensing sites. Several planners 
wanted to use elementary and middle schools. CDC’s later guidance modified 
the recommendation to high schools rather than just any school. Exercises and 
site assessments demonstrated that the design of the elementary and middle 
schools was generally restrictive in hallway dimensions and furniture size.46 The 
rationale for using schools, as stated by consultants and as noted in the CDC 
guidance, has been that the locations are generally known to the public and offer 
parking facilities and the infrastructure to support communications for 
management of the site. 
Some jurisdictions, such as Cobb-Douglas, Georgia, have determined that 
the schools within the district are inadequate for the district’s dispensing needs. 
They are too small and using them would require opening too many sites, 
                                            
44 Discussion with the author, September 28, 2006. 
45 Interview with Pam Blackwell (emergency coordinator for the Cobb-Douglas [Georgia] 
Health District), October 10, 2006. 
46 Dispensing site assessments conducted jointly by CDC SNS consultants and the Georgia 
SNS Coordinator in 2003–2005 found that elementary schools and middle schools were less than 
ideal for large numbers of adults to process for mass prophylaxis.  
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creating excessive management and security overhead.47 Cobb-Douglas 
planners have sought larger facilities such as civic centers, realizing that larger 
facilities bring with them a different set of complexities in security, crowd control, 
and line management. These facilities have several benefits that support the 
controlled flow of large numbers of people through the facilities—wide hallways, 
surveillance, and large open areas. Other buildings within the communities have 
also been considered, including supermarkets, warehouses, and retail 
businesses.48 
A few jurisdictions in Georgia initially chose to use places of worship as 
dispensing sites. As the plans for these jurisdictions have undergone further 
evaluations, the planners have determined that the interior of most places of 
worship is too restrictive to support dispensing to the number of people needed 
to meet CDC requirements. This problem does not preclude the use of the 
facilities, but means that the choice of location must be given more 
consideration.49 Small worship facilities with inadequate parking will not fill the 
requirements to support dispensing; however, large places of worship in some 
metropolitan areas have the same characteristics as civic centers and could be 
adequate to support dispensing operations. 
3. Security 
The CDC guidance calls for jurisdictions to conduct a risk analysis to 
determine the security needs for the RSS site and the dispensing sites. These 
risk analyses must also consider other risks within the jurisdiction, and cannot be 
performed in a vacuum. When receiving requests for additional security 
assistance, most community law enforcement agencies have identified a 
shortfall. State law enforcement is similarly constrained when facing a statewide  
 
                                            
47 Pam Blackwell, interview June 2006, and follow-up December 2006. 
48 From author’s participation in multiple planning sessions with community planners 
representing emergency management, law enforcement, education, public health, elected 
officials, and business leaders. 
49 Interviews for this investigation with metropolitan and non-metropolitan SNS planners of 
health districts in Georgia who are reviewing their selected locations. 
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requirement for assisting at the RSS and dispensing sites. Any options being 
considered for the delivery of the medications should not create a greater need 
for security.50 
Identifying a central security planner for a large metropolitan area with 
multiple law enforcement jurisdictions and without a state police force is one of 
the major obstacles faced in planning for CRI support. Directed by the DSNS 
consultant to identify one central coordinator for the twenty-seven-county 
metropolitan statistical area of Atlanta, the Georgia SNS manager has attempted 
to contract with another state agency to meet this need. However, that effort has 
encountered administrative complications. The SNS planner for the state is now 
requesting that a local law enforcement planner accept the role, but it is uncertain 
whether the other metropolitan law enforcement jurisdictions will take direction, 
guidance, or even suggestions from that individual.51 Additional security 
concerns will be addressed in the discussion of the four options. 
                                            
50 Based on the author’s interviews with members of the Georgia Homeland Security 
Taskforce and the Georgia Emergency Management Agency specifically for this investigation, 
comments from law enforcement and emergency management indicate that they are concerned 
there will be unnecessary calls for use of state and local law enforcement to support the 
dispensing site activities at a time when there will be other major security requirements. 
51 The Georgia SNS planner is a direct report to the author. Comments noted took place 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF FOUR OPTIONS FOR RESPONSE 
As noted in the Chapter I, the SNS planners seek to reduce fear within the 
community by demonstrating that the level of preparedness planning is sufficient 
to support the large metropolitan areas. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the interaction 
of the outcomes desired from the options under consideration. The options 
should address the fears of the first responders and their concerns for their family 
members, as well as the concerns of the rest of the community. The alternatives 
must reduce the time required to deliver and dispense the medical supplies of the 
SNS to meet the CDC guidance. At the same time, the options should raise the 
awareness of the community concerning the threat, the response to the threat, 
and the planning and preparation that is being accomplished to meet the threat. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Four Actions Framework, Value Added52 
 
                                            
52 The idea for this representation of a Network-centric Response Curve is taken from Kim 
and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy. 
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The current plans for SNS dispensing call for public health workers to 
conduct operations with the support of traditional volunteers. There are variations 
of this theme that will be discussed below, but the common factor among the 
variations is that public health is the primary control agency at the dispensing 
sites. An alternative, specifically recommended for planning and consideration by 
the CDC guidance, is the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) option that was initiated 
through a memorandum of understanding among DHS, DHHS, and USPS. A 
third option to consider is the use of corporate entities as volunteer organizations 
augmenting the currently planned public health option. The fourth option, which 
combines the options listed above, surfaced as a result of this investigation. Note 
that each of the options discussed builds upon the first option of public health 
personnel and traditional volunteer support at public health–managed dispensing 
sites. 
As a method of summarizing the characteristics of each of the options, a 
chart showing the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities (SWOT) of 
the option will be shown. The SWOT charts are standard analytical techniques 
that will further support the comparisons of the options found in Chapter IV. 
Strengths address those characteristics of the option that support achievement of 
the desired goal. The weaknesses are those characteristics of the option that are 
counter to achieving the goal of saving more lives and instilling confidence in the 
ability to respond. Opportunities are the positive outcomes that are characteristic 
of the option, while threats are negative outcomes characteristic of the option. 
A. OPTION 1: DISPENSING BY PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS 
SUPPORTED BY TRADITIONAL VOLUNTEER STAFF 
In Option 1, the current public health response option, the basic concept is 
that public health employees will open dispensing sites throughout the effected 
community. Staffing for these sites will come from public health and volunteer 
support. The sites will receive antibiotics from the state. People from the 
community will come to the site. At the site, they will be screened by public health 
employees and provide basic medical histories. Public health employees at the 
dispensing site will give instructions concerning the situation, the disease being 
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countered, and the medication. The people being served will have an opportunity 
to ask questions of medically trained personnel. The staffing needs for the 
dispensing sites in this option will quickly consume public health resources and 
require large numbers of volunteers. The extreme involvement of public health in 
this effort means that for the time the dispensing site operations are in operation, 
other public health activities will be severely curtailed. 
Looking at the current plans and guidance at the local level, two distinct 
client groups become evident. The first is responders to the incident, those 
individuals of whom we expect the leadership, expertise, and dedication to mount 
the countermeasures required to contain, reduce, and remove the threat. The 
second is the general population, which consists of greater numbers of people, 
greater complexities, and greater obstacles to be addressed.53 
1. Self-Dispensing of First Responders 
State and local planners generally acknowledge the need to provide 
prophylaxis to first responders and their families separately from the rest of the 
community. The methods chosen for this vary. Most planners have designated 
special sites to serve only first responders. Some jurisdictions in Georgia have 
designated a hospital to serve as the first-responder dispensing site; others have 
decided to use a separate site and make that location available only to the first 
responders. In New York, some jurisdictions have decided that the first 
responders will self-dispense.54 In doing so, they avoid the staffing requirement 
for a separate site for first responders. The pharmaceuticals will be provided to 
the first responder stations directly from the RSS site or from an intermediate 
distribution site. 
2. Dispensing to the General Population 
Using personnel from the community public health offices, supported by 
any volunteer organizations and individuals that local public health has been able 
                                            
53 From author’s review of state and local plans as well as CDC guidance (CDC, Receiving, 
Distributing, and Dispensing). 
54 In an interview with the author, October, 2007, a public health planner in New York stated 
that the county had determined that the only way to meet the timelines for dispensing was to 
allow direct delivery to the first responders. 
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to enlist for support, public health activates dispensing sites. Local law 
enforcement will determine the level of security required for the dispensing sites, 
traffic control, and crowd control. Public health and emergency management 
have worked together to determine the availability of facilities and other support 
for the dispensing sites. Each dispensing site is established with people 
operating under an incident command system for coordination and control. 
Personnel are assigned roles for line management, greeting and screening, 
emergency medical services, information collection, mental health counseling, 
dispensing, and logistical support. The number of persons needed for each site 
depends upon the number of lines being supported, and the desired throughput 
(i.e., the number of people to be provided medication over a given period of time) 
for the site. 
Three types of locations are frequently recommended as dispensing sites: 
local high schools, civic centers, and places of worship. Using high schools as 
dispensing sites for some areas provides known sites within the communities 
with similar physical designs. However, the age of the school can mean that 
there are significant differences in the facility design. Some communities have 
very large high schools meeting all the facility requirements needed to support 
the community. Others are less ideal, and, as noted previously, the planners in 
those communities have looked for larger or better-suited locations, such as civic 
centers. Using civic centers as dispensing sites generally provides better parking 
along with access to security resources of the centers. Using places of worship 
as dispensing sites has been discussed in part. The design of most facilities is 
considered too limiting by the local SNS planners. However, some of the larger 
places of worship are similar to civic centers and have many of the same aspects 
of support that large businesses and large high schools do. 
Using hospitals as dispensing sites is generally discouraged. The CDC 
guidance specifically discourages the use of hospitals as dispensing sites in the 




by the medical care providers. However, some communities plan for hospitals to 
dispense to hospital staff, and possibly first responders and their immediate 
family members. 
There are several variations to this option, but all require staffing by official 
public health workers and large numbers of volunteers. The drive-through 
dispensing site concept, a variation of the dispensing site with some similarities 
to a fast food restaurant operation, was frequently raised during discussions with 
emergency preparedness and response planners.55 An individual family member 
would drive to a dispensing site location. Never leaving the car, he or she would 
provide the personal medical history needed by public health, sign any special 
releases needed for medications still undergoing the investigative process, 
receive instruction concerning the agent and the countermeasures being 
employed, and have any concerns about the medication addressed. This 
variation limits the amount of person-to-person contact among those waiting for 
medication, but the staffing requirements are unchanged. The drive-through 
version poses more traffic control issues than a walk-through, and security 
requirements are essentially the same.56 
Another variation of public health–led dispensing sites focuses on the 
availability and participation of individual volunteers from the community, and 
possibly from elsewhere in the state and region, who may be able to support 
RSS and dispensing site activities. The jurisdictions are actively recruiting 
volunteers to provide both medical and non-medical support. The number of 
public health staff available at the state and local level is inadequate to conduct 
the mass prophylaxis required. These volunteers are critical to successful 
response under current planning and preparedness models. 
                                            
55 During the 2005 influenza vaccination clinics, the Gainesville Health District conducted 
drive-through clinics. 
56 Several health districts in Georgia have used the drive-through model for influenza 
vaccination clinics. Traffic control was a major issue, and there was no real benefit in staff 
reduction. Some planners believe that the drive-through variant will coax more people to 
participate, however, as they will have less person-to-person contact. 
34 
Organized volunteers are also being recruited by state and local public 
health. The local chapters of the American Red Cross and the Medical Reserve 
Corps units are perhaps the best examples of local and multi-county regional 
attempts to develop organized, skilled, response capacity and capability. These 
organizations can provide volunteers in organized, structured groups that can be 
merged with the dispensing-site operations without the need to establish a 
command and control structure for the people belonging to the organizations. 
However, the numbers recruited are relatively few when balanced against the 
total needed, and the structure available at this time is basically unformed. 
Table 3.1 shows the considerable characteristic weaknesses and threats 
to the successful implementation of current plans, but also indicates the 
strengths to be considered in this option. These characteristics will be used for 
comparison of the options in the next chapter. The greatest problem seems to be 
the reliance upon a flawed volunteer system to provide the number and types of 
volunteers needed.57 The greatest strength of the option comes from the public 
health site control and client interaction. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Known facilities 
• Screening of clients 
• Client redress 
• Public Health controls 
• Limited medical support 
• Limited non-medical support 
• Reliance on limited traditional volunteer 
assets 
• Security support is stretched 
• Possibility of volunteer no-shows 
Opportunities Threats 
• Interagency coordination 
• Team development 
• Lack of public health support in other 
planning and response 
• Failure to achieve success 
Table 3.1 SWOT for Current Public Health Response Option 
 
Opportunities arising from this option include interagency coordination that 
can be carried into other planning and preparedness activities. It also has the 
                                            
57 The Hurricane Katrina after-action reports identified numerous problems with Red Cross 
response. Similar issues have been noted in hurricane response at the state and local level 
where public health has been called upon to use its resources, which have other functions to be 
addressed, to bolster the Red Cross response. These comments are not made to lessen the 
importance of support for the American Red Cross and its many preparedness programs, but to 
indicate that the volunteer programs have very real management and reliability issues.   
35 
benefit of creating multidisciplinary teams that can be used in other response 
activities. The threats include the failure of the effort to reach the entire 
community in two days and the lack of public health support to other planning 
and response efforts. 
B. OPTION 2: DISPENSING SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES 
POSTAL SERVICE 
The concept for Option 2, the postal service option, is to have the USPS 
mail carriers deliver enough medication to each residence within the community 
to provide time for the dispensing sites to be established. The medication will be 
distributed to the mail carriers from a central location. For security, the carriers 
will be teamed with law enforcement officials who will accompany them during 
the delivery to the homes and other residences. 
The concept is based on an existing system of delivery that has the 
potential to touch every residence within a community every twenty-four hours as 
a matter of routine. Another supporting factor is the belief that the mail carriers 
have in-depth knowledge of the households on their routes that will assist in 
emergency mass prophylaxis.58 The DHS, DHHS, and USPS have executed a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that states that USPS will support the public 
health mass prophylaxis efforts following a terrorist incident. The CDC 
Cooperative Agreement requires the states to plan for the use of the post office 
support for at least one zip code at a minimum. In developing the MOA, the 
postal workers union has insisted that adequate security for this option means 
having a law enforcement officer riding with each mail carrier. 
Offered as a means to relieve the critical timelines associated with 
dispensing and gain time for establishing dispensing sites, this option requires 
detailed planning and coordination among law enforcement, public health, and 
the postal service. Separate discussions with members of DSNS indicate that 
recent exercises have shown that one carrier is able to deliver antibiotics to two 
                                            
58 This claim was made by both the CDC representative and the USPS representative at the 
CRI orientation in Atlanta in 2004. The reference to mail carriers having great insight into the 
residents along their routes has been stated in orientation meetings at the CRI orientation 
sessions in the CRI meetings. There has been no evidence offered to support this claim. 
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routes, halving the security requirements that had initially been calculated. If, 
however, this activity is being conducted to gain time, it will be taking place 
concurrently with efforts to activate dispensing sites, thus competing with other 
response efforts for resources.59  
Table 3.2 is summarizes the strengths and weaknesses associated with 
Option 2. The most critical weakness is the lack of professional medical 
interaction with the people receiving the medication. Another primary concern is 
the increased demand upon security forces within the community.60 Perhaps the 
greatest benefit of this option comes from the use of an existing system with its 
associated resources and processes to rapidly deliver the antibiotics to every 
business and residence in the community. The opportunities that this option 
fosters include closer coordination between local public health and the postal 
service. It also enhances the USPS presence in the community. The threats that 
are possible with this option include the failure to obtain data critical to the public 
health response and follow up.  The option relies on information to be returned by 
the recipient of the antibiotics, if requested.  No information concerning who, 




• Adds to non-medical support (carriers) 
• Rapid initial delivery 
 
• Stress to local law enforcement 
resources for security support 
• Requires changes in legislation 
• No medical professional screening 
• No immediate monitoring for adverse 
reactions 
• No in-person redress for client 
concerns 
Opportunities Threats 
• Rapid delivery throughout the 
community 
• Buys time for dispensing site 
operations 
• Enhances USPS public relations 
• Client distress 
• Possible loss of client data (history) 
• Legal issues 
Table 3.2 SWOT for the Postal Service Option 
                                            
59 CDC, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing. 
60 This concern has been voiced during planning sessions with local law enforcement 
planners from metropolitan areas including Seattle and Atlanta. 
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C. OPTION 3: DISPENSING SUPPORTED BY PRIVATE BUSINESSES 
In Option 3, private businesses would assume the role more generally 
familiar to volunteers. The business would be the volunteering entity, offering its 
personnel, management structure, facilities, and leadership to assist the 
dispensing operations. The business location would become the dispensing site. 
The company’s medical personnel would provide the clinical direction required by 
law; company staff would provide site management, leadership, and personnel; 
and the company’s security personnel would provide site security. Public health 
would coordinate delivery of the antibiotics to the company. After company 
employees receive medication for themselves and their families, they would then 
support dispensing efforts at either the company’s site or public health sites in 
other parts of the community. 
The health districts within the Atlanta MSA continue to seek new ways to 
support the dispensing effort of the CRI. During an exercise in Cobb County, 
Georgia, in 2005, Lockheed Martin was requested by the local health district to 
participate in an initial proof-of-concept exercise. The concept was that company 
medical staff, as well as non-medical employees, could support a dispensing site 
at the company’s location. The company’s employees would then be available to 
support another dispensing site operated by local public health. The exercise 
was part of a larger dispensing evaluation that included five metropolitan health 
districts. The company accepted the offer. While the after-action review indicated 
room for improvement, the basic concept was successful.61  
Because this option involves a new use of businesses to support the 
dispensing effort by providing more than just facilities or just people as 
volunteers, further discussion is required. While searching for sufficient 
volunteers and assisting businesses that were attempting to prepare for 
response to a bioterrorism incident or a natural disaster, the Georgia Division of 
Public Health was invited by Conrad Busch, the Director of the Metro Atlanta 
                                            
61 The author was the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator of the Georgia Division of 
Public Health in August 2005 during the exercises referenced. Pam Blackwell was the Cobb-
Douglas Health District Emergency Preparedness Director. The comments concerning the 
exercise are a summary of multiple discussions prior to and following the exercise. 
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Region of BENS, to join the local chapter to assist in its efforts to better prepare 
the business community for response to a terrorist incident. The BENS Atlanta 
Chapter established a bioterrorism advisory group to coordinate the development 
of a preparedness guide for small- and medium-sized businesses. The result of 
that effort was the pamphlet, Getting Ready: Company Primer on Preparedness 
and Response Planning for Terrorist and Bioterrorist Attacks.62  
The initial association with BENS led to further consideration of ways 
business could support public health in countermeasure response and 
administration, and particularly the mass dispensing effort. The basis for the 
concept of support was that large businesses, as volunteer resources, 
traditionally serve as a deep reservoir of manpower. Some have also volunteered 
facilities under special circumstances to support disaster response. However, 
looking beyond the people and facilities resources, the public health response 
planners saw that large businesses as volunteer entities could bring personnel, 
both medical and non-medical, in organized teams prepared to assist in the 
delivery of the medications and more.63 Corporate participation would bring 
management, organization, leadership, facilities, transportation resources, 
security, communications, and coordination support. 
Facilities available through large businesses would vary, of course, but 
most large businesses have areas that are easily modified to serve as dispensing 
sites. Similarly, many large companies have transportation resources, both 
vehicles and drivers, to support the dispensing efforts in moving supplies, 
medication, or personnel. The involvement of the private businesses could 
greatly simplify the coordination requirements for personnel, locations, and 
transportation. 
                                            
62 Business Executives for National Security, Getting Ready: Company Primer on 
Preparedness and Response Planning for Terrorist and Bioterrorist Attacks (Atlanta, GA: BENS 
“Atlanta Chapter, 2006. 
63 The author served as one of the Georgia Homeland Security Taskforce representatives to 
the BENS and Georgia Business Force Homeland Security Operations Group and its 
Consequence Management workgroup from 2003 to the present. 
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Security is normally an internal or contracted activity for corporations. 
Coordinating with those assets for security during the dispensing operations at 
the corporate site will relieve some of the pressures being placed on local law 
enforcement.64 Therefore, this option would require closer coordination between 
corporate security and local law enforcement, but would build on the public-
private partnerships that have grown since 9/11. The exchange of information, 
strategies for internal and external security, and interoperable communications 
will need coordination between private and government security agencies. 
However, since the attacks of 2001, law enforcement agencies and corporate 
security have been sharing more information on a regular basis. 
Table 3.3 shows the strengths and weaknesses associated with the 
corporate option. Changes to liability and indemnity legislation still need to be 
addressed. Corporate participation is ruled by weighing the benefits to be gained 
from being a good citizen of the community against the possible costs of 
participation. Some of the costs go beyond the immediate loss of productivity on 
the day of dispensing, carrying over into workers’ compensation or other injury 
liability that could be associated with support of a mass dispensing operation. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Full community support for the 
response 
• Existing infrastructure—leadership, 
organization, facilities, transportation, 
staff 
• Medical and non-medical staff 
availability 
• Liability of businesses 
• Indemnity issues for businesses 
 
Opportunities Threats 
• Public relations showing support for the 
community, employees, families 
• Public health staff available for other 
pressing needs 
• Follow on cooperative activities 
between government and businesses 
• Perceptions of favoritism 
• Stigma of being “contaminated” 
• Training and exercise requirements 
Table 3.3 SWOT for the Corporate Support Option 
 
                                            
64 This comment requires a caveat. Many employees of private security companies, and 
many security employees of corporations, are also active law enforcement officers who are 
working around their primary job schedules. 
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The opportunities offered by Option 3 begin with the positive public 
relations benefits for both the government and the businesses involved. 
Successful planning and coordination of this effort could yield great confidence in 
the community and its ability to respond to the aftermath of a large scale 
bioterrorism incident. A lesser opportunity comes through the possibility of 
cooperative efforts in other health matters and community affairs. There are risks 
associated with this option. Some members of the community may feel 
disenfranchised or unsupported by this option. There is the possibility that the 
government might be perceived as giving preferential treatment to one business 
over another. 
D. OPTION 4: COMPOSITE SUPPORT RESPONSE USING A MIX OF THE 
THREE OPTIONS 
In the composite option, all three of the previously discussed options are 
used to provide rapid dispensing of antibiotics. The casual observation might be 
that combing the three options provides the best response by using all the 
resources available to move the antibiotics quickly. Clearly, this option has the 
advantage of enlisting full community support. Corporate and government 
leadership work together to address the immediate problem facing the 
community. However, there are concerns that must be addressed in this option. 
Just as the positive aspects are enhanced in this option, there are weaknesses 
that must be considered. The planners will need to organize command and 
coordination efforts to determine whether phasing of the combination of the 
options for the response would best bring resources to bear. Communications 
and leadership coordination must be clearly identified and practiced. 
Table 3.4 shows the strengths and weakness associated with the 
combination option. The legislation needed to support the combined option will 
include that needed in both the postal and corporate options. (Although the need 
for client data and other desired interaction between medical professionals and 
those who are receiving the antibiotics will further influence the selection of viable 
areas for the postal option.) The the opportunities and threats of the combined 
option amplify those found in the individual options. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
• Full community support for the 
response 
• Existing infrastructure—leadership, 
organization, facilities, transportation, 
staff 
• Medical and non-medical staff 
availability 
• Not everyone gets same mode of 
support 
• Requires changes in legislation 
Opportunities Threats 
• Involves full community 
• Can support development of local 
ownership of the problem and its 
solution 
• Possible appearance of inequity 
• Miscommunication 
• Nonparticipation by key organizations 
Table 3.4 SWOT for the Composite Support Option 
 
While the legislative issues must be addressed across the board, 
determining the right mix of options will remain a local issue. Selection of the 
options to use, and where and when to implement these options, is a local 
decision that will be supported by available federal and state assets. All assets, 
once provided to the local government for use in response to an incident, 
become local assets until the disaster is determined to have been contained. 
Information sharing within the community is critical. Transparent local decision 
making will prevent distress within the community that can be caused by 
perceptions of inequity in delivery and dispensing. Reported instances of panic 
and fear associated with food and water distribution sites during flood response 
activities support the need to be clear and open in sharing information. Most of 
these activities, however, will need to be initiated long before large numbers of 
federal or state resources are available. Local response planners and policy 
makers will need to address the right mix both as a part of planning and 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIONS 
This chapter provides a comparison of the four major options being 
considered at this time—public health agencies assisted by traditional volunteer 
methods, public health assisted by the U.S. Postal Service, public health assisted 
by corporate volunteers, and a combination of the options to best reach the 
community. The options add different levels of value to the community response. 
The analysis uses the values listed in Chapter I as the criteria for evaluation. For 
each option, a strategy canvas will be used to illustrate how well the option meets 
the key criteria. The criteria will be listed along the x axis and the extent to which 
the option meets that requirement (high versus low y value) will be shown on the 
y axis. The purpose of the strategy canvas is to provide a visual context of the 
degree of sufficiency found within the option to support the goal of saving more 
lives and creating confidence in the community’s ability to respond to the threat 
of terrorist attacks. 
A. CURRENT PUBLIC HEALTH AND TRADITIONAL VOLUNTEER 
RECRUITING OPTION 
The current public health response option calls for public health 
employees to identify dispensing site facilities and coordinate the staff and other 
support required for the dispensing site operations. Using community committees 
with representation from key government agencies has encouraged some 
community ownership of the process. However, exercises conducted to evaluate 
response capacity and capability have experienced limited involvement from any 
agencies outside the primary planning groups. Coordination of personnel, 
facilities, and security has been driven by public health, and has received varying 
degrees of support. 
Although this option is most frequently exercised, the response time has 
not been effectively measured. Exercise assumptions remove the more vexing 
problems, such as volunteer shortages and security demands of the community 
in general, and fail to adequately consider the competing needs of the 
community. The multiple demands of emergency response for medical and non-
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medical volunteers, for security support, and for facility support are rarely 
considered by the exercises. There are, however, some assumptions that can be 
made concerning the response time associated with this option. The time at 
which any alert or alarm that requires public health and volunteer response 
occurs will affect the rapidity of the response. Events that take place after hours, 
on weekends, or on holidays will have a delayed response. Notification of 
volunteers and effective response times will require greater coordination to 
achieve participation by people with the right skills within the timeframe identified. 
As discussed in Chapter III, this option provides dispensing sites to 
support mass prophylaxis. It provides a capacity greater than that of the 
community alone, with its daily response options of local pharmacies, clinics, and 
hospitals. It is the first step towards creating greater dispensing capacity within 
the community. It enhances the availability of medical care providers to support 
screening and dispensing by soliciting the support of medically trained volunteers 
and by using clinical public health employees. 
Unfortunately, this option does not have an internal security support 
system. Public health officials have worked with local law enforcement officials to 
identify security requirements. The activities at the dispensing site require law 
enforcement support for traffic control, crowd control, and general security 
coordination. The CDC has also requested special security considerations for the 
TARU, which accompanies the SNS materiel. This support is coordinated with 
local and state law enforcement by the U.S. marshals who will accompany the 
stockpile. This security requirement will draw security resources from other 
needed activities within the community. 
Dispensing site design considerations for current operations include the 
need for gathering client information while people wait for their medication. 
Screening and dispensing are both supervised by clinical professionals. As part 
of the dispensing process, those who are getting antibiotics complete 
questionnaires. Because the people come to the dispensing site, there is redress 
available for them on site. 
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The efficiency and timeliness of the current system could be improved if 
state and local legislation were modified. The requirement for specific levels of 
clinical supervision of dispensing imposes some restrictions on dispensing site 
operations. This requirement could delay dispensing site activities solely for the 
lack of a pharmacist or a physician. 
Clearly, one of the greatest problems with this option is the need for large 
numbers of non-medical support personnel, which public health is unable to 
provide directly. People are needed to provide logistical support, resupply of the 
facility, administrative support for various actions within the site, general line 
management, and command and control support. 
Figure 4.1, a strategy canvas modified from Blue Ocean Strategy, shows 
the relative performance variance of current planning and procedures for 
dispensing site operations within the selected values. Running from high support 
of the dispensing site operations to low support, the chart provides a quick view 
of possible problem areas within the response. 
 
























Strategy Canvas for Dispensing Site:  










Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? This 
option builds the response around the local public health organization. There is 
some community ownership in supporting the effort, but it is limited to the 
agencies immediately involved in planning for the response and the direct 
contacts for volunteers. 
Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? This 
option provides the baseline for response times against which the other options 
are compared. Its response time is limited to the availability of the public health 
employees and the volunteers who will assist in establishing the dispensing sites. 
Does the option increase the number of people who can be served within 
a given timeframe? Again, this option establishes the baseline against which the 
other options are compared. It is limited by the number of sites that public health 
employees can staff and support within the metropolitan area. 
Does the option enhance the availability of medical care providers to 
support screening and dispensing? The current planning uses public health 
clinical and other medical professionals as the base for support of the dispensing 
sites. Medical professionals as volunteers further enhance the availability of 
medical care providers to support screening and dispensing. 
Does the option reduce the security personnel requirements? The security 
requirements of this option are determined by local law enforcement per the SNS 
guidelines. The requirements for this option establish the baseline for the 
comparison of the other options. 
Does the option support gathering needed information about the people 
who receive the medication? Data gathering requirements are planned as part of 
the activities of the dispensing sites managed by public health agencies. The 
planners have considered various methods to streamline the process, and it is a 
major consideration for the dispensing site operations. 
Does the option provide redress for the clients? As with the gathering of 
information and the screening and dispensing support, this option has medical 
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personnel on site to provide assistance to people who have additional issues 
concerning the antibiotics or the disease. This option sets that baseline for 
evaluating redress for the clients. 
Does the option require new legislation or changes in existing legislation? 
There are some areas that require further legal review. Legislation to address the 
actual dispensing of antibiotics by non-medical personnel might further support 
this option. However, the option is built around current legislation and could run 
without any change in the legislation addressing special executive orders from 
the Governor. 
Does the option enhance the availability of non-medical support personnel 
for dispensing activities? This option is limited in the availability of non-medical 
support personnel. It relies on traditional individual volunteers to provide most 
non-public health employee support at the dispensing sites. 
B. THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE OPTION 
Using the postal service to support the public health mass prophylaxis 
effort provides for swift general delivery of the antibiotics. However, the USPS is 
generally seen as a federal agency even though it is a private operation. The 
memorandum of agreement among DHS, DHHS, and USPS serves to further 
alienate local and state public health and emergency management planners and 
responders and further removes local ownership of the problem and its solution. 
The USPS option provides better response time to the problem. By using 
a system that is already in place for daily delivery to residences and businesses, 
the planners would avoid the need to establish any other direct delivery means. 
Postal delivery workers have indicated a desire to support the response effort. 
Using the postal service has the potential to reach a greater number of people 
within forty-eight hours, as this group reaches out to every mailbox in every 
community at least once every twenty-four hours. 
This option also provides a great resource for non-medical support 
personnel for dispensing activities. The use of the postal system provides 
personnel who are well versed in the logistical support needed to move 
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something quickly through the community. The support personnel of the postal 
system will also be able to assist with the further breakdown and repackaging of 
the medication for delivery through the mail system. 
One of the difficulties with this option is the inability to provide direct 
supervision by medical care providers for screening and dispensing. With the 
antibiotics delivered directly to the residence, there is no interaction between a 
physician or nurse and the individual who will be taking the medication. There are 
certain contraindications for some of the antibiotics planned for use in the initial 
response to an anthrax attack. The clients have no immediate means of redress 
should they have questions concerning the medication. (A flyer with contact 
information is to be distributed with the antibiotics.)  
This option also poses problems in supporting the need to gather 
information concerning the medical history of those receiving the medication. 
Several methods are being considered to cover this gap, ranging from asking the 
individuals to complete a postcard to requesting that they go on-line to complete 
a questionnaire. These activities are unlikely to be successful because all the 
suggested approaches require voluntary action on the part of the client. 
The USPS option actually increases the requirements for security support. 
The postal service has requested security support for each delivery worker while 
on the route to dispensing the antibiotics. Depending on the size of the 
community served, this could be a very large security requirement to be met at 
the same time that security is being established for community dispensing sites. 
The USPS option requires setting aside laws governing the dispensing of 
antibiotics. In this case, there would be no clinical supervision of the medication 
from the time that it is provided to the mail delivery service. State legislation will 
be needed to support this option. 
The strategy canvas developed for this option, found in Figure 4.2, shows 
the relative performance variance for dispensing operations within the selected 
values. Although this option increases the timeliness of the response, there are 
severe shortfalls to be addressed in monitoring client health. Also, the need for 
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legislation to support the concept is clear, as there is no medical supervision 
once the medication enters the mail system. For this option to be viable, the state 




Figure 4.2 Strategy Canvas for USPS Support Plan 
 
Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? The 
USPS option places the expedient response to the problem into the hands of an 
agency that is seen as a federal or national entity. The community ownership 
may not be enhanced by this option. However, the mail carrier is also someone 





































Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? The 
option using the USPS to support the mass dispensing of prophylaxis does 
provide for a better response time. This option, by itself, does not require a 
dispensing site operation. The antibiotics could be issued directly to the mail 
carrier from a distribution center. The delivery of medication would be completed 
in the same amount of time that the mail is delivered. 
Does the option increase the number of people who can be served within 
a given timeframe? The USPS support option greatly enhances the capacity to 
serve the community. However, it is not the complete solution. Transient 
populations will not be well served by this option, and other considerations must 
be given for travelers, the homeless, and others who would not fit this option. 
Does the option enhance the availability of medical care providers to 
support screening and dispensing? This option does not enhance client 
screening and the dispensing of antibiotics by medical support personnel. 
Does the option reduce the security personnel requirements? The 
requirement to provide a law enforcement officer to accompany each mail carrier 
places an additional requirement upon security, not a reduction in the 
requirement. 
Does the option support gathering needed information about the people 
who receive the medication? The USPS option does not fully support the 
gathering of medical histories and other data desired, and in some cases 
required, by public health officials, as in the use of investigational drugs for the 
response. This option relies upon the individual medication recipient completing a 
questionnaire and mailing the form to the local public health agency. 
Does the option provide redress for the clients? The USPS option does 
not provide direct redress for the people who receive the drugs. They cannot ask 
questions of a technical nature of the mail carrier. There is, however, the 
possibility of providing support for redress via the internet or through a call 
center. This would require additional planning and coordination to implement. 
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Does the option require new legislation or changes in existing legislation? 
This option will require new legislation or an executive order to permit mail 
carriers to dispense medication. 
Does the option enhance the availability of non-medical support personnel 
for dispensing activities? The USPS option provides a great deal of non-medical 
labor to support the mass dispensing effort. 
C. THE CORPORATE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC HEALTH OPTION 
Involving the community business leaders and their companies in planning 
and preparation for response to a bioterrorism incident encourages ownership of 
the problem by all the resources of the community. It also increases involvement 
of government agency leadership in the coordination of the planning. It 
encourages the use of the total community in planning and preparing for 
response to a disaster that would require mass prophylaxis. It has the potential 
for better response time as the workplace becomes the dispensing site for a 
large part of the community. Those supporting the dispensing site are reporting 
to their normal workplaces rather than trying to find a location with which they 
may not be familiar. 
The corporate option adds to the number of people who can be served as 
it frees public health officials to open and support other facilities, while the 
corporation’s employees can support other dispensing sites once they have 
received antibiotics themselves. It enhances the availability of medical personnel 
by using the corporate staff clinicians to supervise the dispensing operations. It 
also enhances the gathering of needed information about the people who receive 
the medication, as the corporation’s medical section can perform the screening 
and collect medical histories. The option provides for client redress through the 
medical personnel who will be on site. This option reduces the pressure on local 
law enforcement for security by using the company’s own security provider to 
meet this need. Coordination between the security section and local law 
enforcement will further strengthen security at the dispensing site. The availability 
of non-medical support personnel for dispensing activities is supported by the 
bulk of the company’s employees. 
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There is a need for new legislation or changes in existing legislation with 
respect to the state “Good Samaritan” laws. Corporate lawyers have expressed 
some concern with liability and indemnity issues should companies agree to 
support the dispensing efforts.65 Without changes in state and local ordinances 
that address these concerns, recruiting local businesses to support this effort will 
be exceedingly difficult. 
The strategy canvas in Figure 4.3 shows the improvements expected with 
corporate involvement in the dispensing effort and this option’s variance for 
dispensing operations support within the selected values. This option appears to 
bring all the community resources to bear upon the problem. Of particular note, 
the concept of total community response to the problem begins to take shape 
with this option. It also shows the need for legislation to support this option. 
 
                                            
65 From author’s discussions with BENS members, their company operations officers, and 
their company legal representatives at SNS support planning meetings from October 2003 
through January 2007. 
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Figure 4.3 Strategy Canvas for Corporate Support Plan 
 
Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? Yes, 
this option encourages community ownership of both the problem and the 
solution. Community business leaders become partners in supporting the 
response. The government and private business partnership serves to bring the 
community into the planning and preparation for the response. 
Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? The 
response time will be enhanced by the additional locations and the employee 
familiarity with the facility being used. Additional support will also be available to 
assist at the sites, increasing the number of people who can be served. 
Does the option increase the number of people who can be served within 
a given timeframe? It supports better response time by providing alternative 
locations for dispensing, by providing more staff and management options for the 





































the people being served will have to come to the dispensing site. Depending 
upon implementation of the option, this could include both employees and 
nonemployees being served by the company. 
Does the option enhance the availability of medical care providers to 
support screening and dispensing? Using the company medical staff will 
enhance the dispensing site effort by making more public health medical 
professionals available to support the public dispensing sites. 
Does the option reduce the security personnel requirements? Additional 
security support is not necessitated by this option. Corporate security becomes 
the site security support. 
Does the option support gathering needed information about those who 
receive the medication? As with the public health agency locations, the medical 
personnel and their support group within the company will be able to take 
medical history and other information desired by the local public health agency 
directly from the people at the site. 
Does the option provide redress for the clients? Medical staff will be on 
site, so there is immediate redress for the clients. 
Does the option require new legislation or changes in existing legislation? 
The business community has requested modification of the “Good Samaritan” 
laws to protect them from liability and indemnity litigation. This change would not 
protect them from willful negligence, but would protect them from incidental 
injuries. 
Does the option enhance the availability of non-medical support personnel 
for dispensing activities? This option brings the workforce of the community to 
bear. The community ownership of the problem and its solution greatly enhances 
the availability of non-medical labor to support the mass dispensing effort. 
D. COMPOSITE OPTION 
Just as the corporate support option enhances community ownership of 
the problem, so too does the concept of a composite option that combines the 
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three options discussed earlier. The decisions concerning the right mix of 
strategies will be a local government responsibility, to be supported by state and 
federal assets. If the necessary planning and coordination are undertaken prior to 
the incident, this option will be timely and reach more people faster and more 
efficiently than any of the other options by themselves. However, if the decisions 
about where to implement which option are made during a crisis without full 
community coordination, this option would be too complex to be accomplished 
efficiently or effectively. 
The combination option has both the best and worst features of the 
previous approaches. Because it considers the use of the postal option, there 
would be some parts of the community where medical supervision, data 
collection, and client redress will not be well supported. Other sections of the 
community will be better served in those areas, but the people will have to travel 
to the dispensing sites.  Parameters will have to be established, and the local 
elected and appointed officials will need to be involved in developing and 
implementing those decisions. 
Similarly, this option enhances the availability of non-medical support 
personnel for dispensing activities. Using both the postal option and the 
corporate option provides for greater numbers of non-medical personnel to 
support the effort. It also gives the planners more options for focused effort in the 
response. 
The security demands for this option are not as heavy as those for a pure 
postal option, nor are they as limited as for the corporate option. The section of 
the community supported by the postal option will still require additional law 
enforcement support, while the areas supported by the corporate option will 
relieve some of the security pressures. 
This option will require legislation to address all the concerns found in the 
three previous approaches. Choosing to move forward with this option will 
actually cause a greater expenditure of effort to achieve the change in state law.  
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However, the legislative changes would be supportive not only of response to a 
terrorist event, but any outbreak that required mass prophylaxis in a very short 
timeframe.  
Figure 4.4 uses a strategy canvas to show the variance for this option 
within the selected values for dispensing operations and shows that the 
composite option exhibits both the best and worst of the individual options 
discussed within the criteria established for this investigation. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Strategy Canvas for Composite Support Plan 
 
Does the option encourage community ownership of the problem? Yes, 
this option encourages community ownership of the problem. Bringing all three 
options into play will require active participation by community leaders. 
Does the option provide for better response time to the problem? Using all 
three options will improve response time over the baseline response of public 
health organizations supported by traditional volunteer support. 
 
 






























Does the option increase the number of people who can be served within 
a given timeframe? The option provides alternatives that would meet the need to 
reach not only the residents, but also the transient populations within the 
geographical area requiring support. 
Does the option enhance the availability of medical care providers to 
support screening and dispensing? The answer is both yes and no. For the areas 
selected for support by the USPS option, the availability is not enhanced, but the 
use of the corporate sites will add to the number of locations within the 
community that will have medical support. 
Does the option reduce the security personnel requirements? This option 
does not reduce the security requirements of the dispensing sites, as the areas 
using the postal option will require law enforcement support. However, it does 
make use of corporate security so there are no additional security requirements 
at those locations. This option also increases the need for information sharing 
among the law enforcement and security elements of the community. 
Does the option support gathering needed information about the people 
who receive the medication? This option does provide for gathering data at the 
dispensing sites. However, it will not fully support gathering data for those who 
receive the medication through the mail carriers. 
Does the option provide redress for the clients? It does provide some 
redress for the clients. 
Does the option require new legislation or changes in existing legislation? 
The composite option will require all of the legislative changes that each of the 
component options would require. 
Does the option enhance the availability of non-medical support personnel 
for dispensing activities? Yes, the composite option enhances the of the 
community labor pool. It reaches into the community for support from 
government and private business, taking advantage of the workforce throughout 
the community. 
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E. BENEFITS AND RISKS 
1. Benefits to Government 
Considering these four options, the government at all levels could benefit 
greatly from the public relations gained by showing that private industry and the 
multiple levels of government are working together for the support of the 
community. The corporate option in particular lets business and government 
collectively approach a problem that neither seems able to adequately solve 
alone; it allows them to enhance one another’s strengths by working together. 
This partnership then enhances the preparation of the community for response 
by gathering the resources of the community in a coordinated response. 
One of the key benefits for the government is having centralized volunteer 
coordination provided through the businesses of the community. Rather than 
depending on the unreliable numbers of volunteers expected through individual 
traditional volunteer activities, this option provides planners a member of the 
community (a business or corporation) with a self-interest tied to the community’s 
survival. Logistics of the dispensing operations appear to be better defined as 
responsibilities for support are aligned with the company providing the facilities 
for the dispensing site. Finally, the security requirements will be shared, rather 
than shouldered by law enforcement alone. Tying corporate security to the 
security activities of the dispensing site that the company provides aligns law 
enforcement with corporate security, and lets law enforcement continue in a 
supervisory role without expending precious law enforcement resources. 
2. Benefits to Corporations 
The public relations benefits for corporations include embracing their civic 
responsibility to the community and again, as with government, the gain that 
comes from working together to protect the community. In addition to the public 
relations benefits, the companies gain in community involvement and 
identification with the employees. The planning and preparation can serve to 
strengthen management and leadership relationships within the organization. 
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Another benefit gained by the companies is found in the care of 
employees. Employees who receive the antibiotics are more likely to survive and 
continue to work. In supporting the dispensing effort, the company is protecting 
its workforce. 
3. Benefits for the USPS 
The benefits for the postal service are similar to those of the corporations. 
Participating in the mass dispensing efforts increases the sense of belonging to 
the community, identifying them as the premier delivery system for the 
community. It also ensures that the postal service workforce is among the first to 
receive the antibiotics. In serving the community in this disaster response, the 
postal service enhances pride within the agency. 
4. Risks for Government 
There are risks involved in these options. For the government, there is the 
admission that government cannot successfully support the community without 
assistance. The government is depending on volunteers, both for numbers and 
for skills, to meet the dispensing sites’ operational requirements. There may be 
an increased liability for the state or local government depending upon changes 
made in the state laws. 
Politically, there is a risk of a perception of favoritism or inequity in the 
support given, i.e., that certain segments of the community are receiving 
preferential treatment. This happens frequently during response to hurricane or 
tornado damage, when water is delivered differently in various parts of a 
community. To counter any appearance of inequity, the community must use a 
fully transparent planning and response process. 
5. Risks for Corporations 
Under current laws, rules, and regulations, companies that are considering 
providing support for the dispensing operations within the community have 
several risks to consider. The first of these risks is liability for injury to someone 
from the general public, who is not an employee of the company, who is hurt 
while within the company’s facility. The second is the risk of indemnity for  
 
60 
company employees if they are injured while supporting dispensing site 
operations. The final risk considered is the stigma that might be attached to the 
company if people reporting for assistance are believed to be contagious. 
The private companies must consider liability for injury or other insult 
rising from the use of their employees or facilities to support members of the 
community not associated with that business. While the companies have 
insurance to cover routine injury that might occur with their employees or clients, 
this situation might be interpreted as being outside normal business operations. 
For example, someone on site, who is not employed by the company nor a usual 
or typical customer of the company, might be injured in a fall, and then bring suit 
against the company. Most businesses have indicated that they would like to 
have this situation addressed by ordinance or other legislation.66 
The corporations must determine whether there is an implied contract to 
compensate their employees for any loss or damage resulting from participation 
in the dispensing activities. If the company is volunteering the services of its 
employees, does worker’s compensation apply if they are injured while assisting 
public health? If either a company employee or another dispensing site client 
becomes ill after participating in the dispensing activities, does the company 
have a responsibility to provide compensation? State and local governments can 
assist in this with appropriate legislation lessening the exposure of companies. 
Georgia and North Carolina have jointly developed draft legislation to address 
shortcomings in current laws for both preparation for and response to disasters.67 
This legislation is meant to permit volunteers to participate in training and 
exercises before an incident as well as in disaster response without being 
concerned about liability for injury that is not caused by willful negligence. The 
legislation, as currently being considered, will cover emergency management 
workers, corporate entities, and healthcare workers. 
                                            
66 Author’s discussions with members of the Georgia Business Force and the Atlanta chapter 
of the Business Executives for National Security, October 2003 to January 2007. 
67 This ongoing work is led by the efforts of Gene Matthews, as well as the legal advisors of 
public health in both Georgia and North Carolina. Drafts of the legislation that will be presented to 
the 2007 legislatures of the two states were reviewed for this investigation. 
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Depending on the biological agent involved, some organizations have 
stated concerns about becoming identified as the location that was possibly 
exposed to a biological agent because they supported the dispensing activities. 
This is an issue that has surfaced in discussions among both government-owned 
and privately owned facilities and is of particular concern for hospitals and 
schools. The stigma attached to a location may require considerable public 
health efforts for employee and general public education concerning the agent 
and its characteristics. 
6. Risks for USPS 
The postal service must ensure that its workers are protected, both from 
the disease and any possible attacks. Having been the victim of collateral 
damage during the anthrax attacks of 2001, the USPS must show its employees 
that it is taking every possible step to protect them from a repeat of those attacks. 
Just as the corporations are concerned about indemnity, the USPS is concerned 
about worker’s compensation issues. 
F. COMPARE AND CONTRAST OPTIONS 
This section provides a comparison and contrast of the options, starting 
with a comparison of public health plus traditional volunteers and the option of 
corporate involvement. The strategy canvas found at Figure 4.5 provides a visual 
comparison showing that the corporate option actually builds upon the traditional 
model, enhancing the community ownership of the problem of dispensing, 
response timeliness, and the support of both medical and non-medical personnel 
to assist in the mass prophylaxis. 
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Figure 4.5 Comparison of Current Public Health Response Plan and 
Corporate Support Option 
 
The corporate model, however, further increases the need for legislative 
adjustments that would encourage and support corporate participation in both the 
planning and preparation activities. The legislation required must cover not only 
the response, but also the training and evaluations conducted to prepare for the 
response. Business legal representatives have stated clearly, during meetings of 
the Georgia Business Force and the Atlanta chapter of BENS, that the corporate 
attorneys will not recommend participation in the effort unless companies are 
protected from liability risks other than those that would result from willful 
negligence. 
These two options would work well in conjunction with one another. The 



























Strategy Canvas for Dispensing Site:  












to be used at other dispensing sites. As noted previously, it would also permit law 
enforcement to support public health site security needs as corporate security 
could cover the needs of the dispensing site run by the businesses. 
The next comparison measures public health plus traditional volunteers 
against public health and USPS support. The USPS model has been strongly 
encouraged by the federal authorities. Figure 4.6 uses the strategy canvas to 
show a visual comparison of the two models. The evident strength of the USPS 
option when compared to the current option is the speed with which the USPS 




Figure 4.6 Comparison of Current Public Health and USPS Support Options 
 
The shortcomings, however, are clearly depicted in the strategy canvas. 
Whereas the current public health option focuses on medical support to screen 
























Strategy Canvas for Dispensing Site: Current Public Health 











option is focused on quick delivery. Also, the assumption that the mail carriers 
know the residents of the routes for each of the communities they will serve may 
be invalid. The carriers may support more than one route. If so, then at least one 
of the routes they support will not be their own daily route and this knowledge 
factor carries even less weight. 
The next comparison is of the base option of public health and traditional 
volunteer support compared with both the corporate support and the USPS 
support options. The strategy canvas at Figure 4.7 shows that legislation 
associated with emergency preparedness and dispensing operations will require 
changes. All of the options are inadequately supported by current state 
legislation. Again, the weaknesses of the postal option are clear, but this is must 
be balanced against the speed with which the postal service can deliver 




Figure 4.7 Comparison of Current Public Health Response, Corporate,  
and USPS Support Options 
 
 
Dispensing Site Support: Current Public Health Response Plan  
































The strategy canvas at Figure 4.8 shows the composite option compared 
to the currently planned public health support option while the strategy canvas at 
Figure 4.9 provides a visual comparison of all four options. These are provided to 
further highlight the manner in which the composite option amplifies the high and 
low levels of support found in the other three approaches. The strategy canvas 
shows a drop in two areas when the composite option is compared to the current 
option. The security requirements are increased by the composite option, and, as 
one might expect, the current legislation is inadequate. 
 
 


























Strategy Canvas for Dispensing Site: Current Public Health Response 












Figure 4.9 Comparison of Current Public Health Response Plan and 
Corporate, USPS, and Composite Support Options 
 
What planners should understand from this comparison is that security 
requirements for the areas of the community selected for the postal option must 
be carefully analyzed by law enforcement to determine the amount of support 
needed for the carriers. The same must be done for the public health-coordinated 
dispensing sites. There must be a strongly supported sharing of information 
between law enforcement and corporate security concerning threats to the 
dispensing site operations. 
The other issue to address is the changes needed to state law. The SNS 
guidance recommends that state public health agencies should strive to initiate 
change in the local and state laws to support dispensing operations during 






Dispensing Site Support: Current Public Health Response Plan with 
































officer prepare documents supporting executive orders implementing emergency 
powers to support the needed dispensing activities.68 The comparison of the 
options further supports the CDC recommendation.  
G. SUMMARY OF OPTIONS AND VALUES 
The investigation reviewed four options and their relative performance 
variance within the selected values. The current option calls for public health to 
orchestrate dispensing of antibiotics at sites throughout the affected metropolitan 
area. Staffing support is being sought through conventional volunteer methods, 
with recruiting of individuals as the primary source of additional staffing. This 
method is the base method that will be enhanced by the implementation of any 
other option. The second option reviewed was the USPS option. By providing 
direct delivery of the antibiotics to the residents of the community, the USPS 
option enhances the speed of delivery, but sacrifices data collection and client 
medical support to achieve that speed. The third option was the corporate 
support option. In this option, the business community steps forward as a 
volunteer entity, providing personnel, facilities, leadership, and organized 
management of dispensing operations at company sites that are operated 
concurrently with public health–managed sites. The composite option, the fourth 
option, combines all three approaches. While enhancing the overall dispensing 
effort, it does so at significant risk of perceived discrimination by sections of the 
metropolitan area. As noted, the differences in the delivery, the requirement to go 
to a dispensing site rather than having the medication delivered to the residence 
and the lack of direct interaction with someone identified as a medical 
professional while others have that assistance available can lead to perceptions 
of treatment preference being given to certain areas of the community.  
The recommendation, based on this analysis, is the third option addressed 
in Chapter III: public health agencies conducting dispensing site operations and 
using the support of larger businesses within the community to provide additional 
sites, staff, leadership, and management for the mass dispensing effort. This  
 
                                            
68 CDC, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing, 12-2. 
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option encourages community ownership of the problem as the business 
community steps forward as a volunteer entity. The next chapter will address 
implementation issues for this option. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
Now that there is a sense of the comparative value of the options, which of 
these alternatives is more likely to be successfully implemented? This chapter 
addresses the policy implications of the analyses presented in the previous 
chapters, and the need for further investigations into solutions for rapid 
dispensing. A review of the hurdles faced by planners implementing the options 
that are being considered will aid in the selection of options to use. Figure 5.1, 
Strategy Execution Considerations, demonstrates how these hurdles play into 




Figure 5.1 Strategy Execution Considerations69 
 
                                            
69 The idea for this representation of the Strategy Execution Considerations is taken from 
Kim and Marbourgne, Blue Ocean Strategy. 
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work? 
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the part of government? 
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Using an analytical framework presented in Blue Ocean Strategy, the 
chart in Figure 5.1 identifies four systematic hurdles to successful implementation 
of a strategic plan. These include cognitive, political, motivational, and resource 
hurdles. For the cognitive hurdle, the question is who has knowledge of the 
threat, response plans, agency roles, responsibilities, and community assets? 
For the motivational hurdle, what are the incentives and benefits for all the 
players to make the proposed option work? For the resource hurdle, what are the 
requirements and what are the costs? For the political hurdle, is there any 
appearance of a loss of power or control on the part of government if a particular 
option is pursued and will possible business rivals gain real or perceived 
advantages using one option as compared with another? 
The cognitive hurdle for the dispensing sites varies from community to 
community and state to state. In Georgia, the local planning groups for 
dispensing operations have included public health, emergency management, law 
enforcement, and fire and rescue operations. Some communities have received 
support from elected officials and some private businesses. Most of the 
knowledge concerning the threat and the plans for response to those threats has 
been held within a small circle of planners. Many more people will need to be 
brought into the planning circle for the options under consideration. These would 
include business leaders and planners, multiple state and local agency planners, 
and elected officials. 
For support of the dispensing sites, the motivational incentives include 
survival, the well being of the community, civic duty, and good public relations. 
To borrow a quote often attributed to Stanley Weiss of BENS, “Being dead is bad 
for business.” He included his customers and employees as well as himself in 
this statement.70 The motivational incentives for elected and appointed officials 
include the identification of a stable source of personnel and facility support for  
 
 
                                            
70 Conrad Busch (executive director, Atlanta Chapter of BENS) in discussion with the author, 
July 15, 2006. 
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dispensing activities. For the employees, there is the knowledge that as part of 
the dispensing effort they will be among the first to secure antibiotics for 
themselves and their families. 
To overcome resource hurdles, government and businesses will need 
much more information, especially more logistical and legal data, to prepare to 
conduct SNS operations. Clearly, however, a primary cost of any business 
participation will involve employee time spent in planning, training, and 
assessments. There could also be liability and indemnity insurance costs 
associated with preparedness and response activities. These may be paid by 
either the businesses or the government, depending upon the laws, rules, and 
regulations established in each state. 
Political hurdles are likely to be the most difficult to surmount as the 
business community and government agencies attempt to sort out the details of 
the coordination required to make the response work. Part of the difficulty will be 
in the legislative requirements that must be met if private business is to 
participate. Another difficulty comes with the need to ensure equitable response 
throughout the metropolitan area. Any variance in the manner of delivery to the 
subdivisions of the community may be perceived as differential treatment giving 
preference to one neighborhood over another. 
The chart at Figure 5.2 lays out the desired outcomes from the SNS 
operations. With total community response, private industry and the multiple 
government agencies working together, the outputs at the dispensing sites can 
lead to communities that feel secure in their planning and preparedness for 
response to a terrorist event. Community ownership of the problem and its 
solution will further the development of sound coordination among the key 
players. 
The options selected for implementation should create community 
ownership of the problem and generate additional resources to support the 
response effort as community awareness of the problem is elevated. The  
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response must be planned and executed in a way that inspires confidence. To do 
this, the option needs to eliminate the uncertainty of support for the response by 
providing a more stable resource for personnel and facilities.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Total Community Response71 
 
A. COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Involving businesses as partners provides a policy option that allows the 
business community to participate more fully. It also adds to community 
ownership of the efforts to prepare for a response in the aftermath of a terrorist 
event. This expansion of the planning and preparation for response serves to 
bring more of the local resources to bear. More than people and facilities are 
                                            
71 The idea for this representation of processing input to achieve outcomes comes from Kim 
and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, and shows input of total community response to achieve 
outputs with desired outcomes. 
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acquired in this decision. Involving businesses in recruiting, training, and 
managing volunteers provides support for the dispensing activities that builds 
upon existing management relationships and structures. In the BENS model, 
once companies have taken care of their own workers, they may then support 
dispensing activities at public health-managed sites within the community. A 
company’s staff, for example, could be a vital supplement to public health and 
other volunteer staffs after the first responders have tired and need rest. 
Involving businesses as volunteer entities also provides additional 
centralized, known locations for dispensing medical supplies with in-house 
security support. Depending upon the type of business, companies may have 
extensive experience managing lines and crowd control. Business volunteer 
entities, if involved in the planning and preparation, provide a viable option for the 
community that can serve to support the public health effort to respond to a 
terrorist attack using biological agents. However, state and local laws will need to 
be modified to provide a greater degree of “Good Samaritan” protection for 
businesses volunteering to participate in training, evaluation, and actual 
response. This may be a difficult obstacle to overcome as states are reluctant to 
change the emergency management and public health legislation. Legislative 
reform may open current law to unwanted scrutiny and debate, which may lead 
to even more difficulties than experienced previously. For instance, requested 
changes may place unnecessary legal and financial burdens on the state while 
removing current desirable controls over some business practices. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
In addition to the “Good Samaritan” legislation, other laws addressing the 
actual dispensing of medication and the rules and regulations developed to 
implement the laws will need to be adjusted to support any method of dispensing 
other than the current public health response. This need applies both to the use 
of the postal service option and to the participation of some of the businesses in 
support of the dispensing activities. The laws regarding who can transfer 
medication to patients, the directions to be given to the patients, and information 
required from the patients will need further review. 
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It will be imperative that government maintain transparency in the planning 
to garner business community support of the concept and the activities. Ensuring 
that employees have a basic awareness of the preparation and planning being 
undertaken by the company and public health officials will lead to greater 
confidence on the part of the community. The involvement of the business 
community will develop ownership of the problem and solution by prominent 
community members—the leaders of the community—for preparation and 
planning for response to an incident or outbreak. Policy implementation will need 
to consider possible backlash by some in the community who may see the effort 
as showing favoritism toward certain companies. 
C. OBSTACLES 
Pharmaceutical legislation, rules, and regulations, as supported by current 
state legislation, also need to be modified to permit disaster response dispensing 
of antibiotics by non-medical personnel. The modification is especially necessary 
to support the postal support option, but would also give more freedom to the 
current public health and corporate support options. To achieve this modification, 
public health officials will need to have the support of the medical and pharmacy 
associations of the state. 
As mentioned earlier, indemnity is a concern of the private companies that 
would participate in the dispensing site activities. The legal counsels for the 
businesses will not support direct participation in the dispensing site activities 
under current state statutes. Their concern is that by offering the services of the 
company and its assets, including its organization and employees, the business 
would be liable for workers’ compensation if the employees became ill or were 
injured while assisting with the dispensing of antibiotics.  
Legal counselors are concerned about other liability issues as well. A 
government position that the company’s insurance should cover the company for 
any liability fails to consider the response of the insurance industry. This liability 




receiving medication from the dispensing sites supported by the company. Such 
a position does little to develop confidence among the leaders of the major 
businesses that the government really cares for their interests. 
Another key obstacle is overcoming waning interest on the part of 
corporate leaders. The longer the time elapsed since the last incident that 
required coordination or support among the players, the more energy and effort 
will be required to regenerate and sustain interest in planning and preparation for 
response. A further factor is the necessity of exhibiting the appearance of 
progress and showing successes in preparation through training and exercises. 
Businesses look for quick returns on their investments. Participation in the 
process of planning and preparing for response to a terrorist incident or natural 
disaster is not an obviously or immediately profitable investment for these 
companies.  
D. PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is urgently needed into the options for both mass 
dispensing of antibiotics and other mass prophylaxis efforts (e.g., mass 
vaccinations) that incorporate the businesses of the community as partners with 
the public health, emergency management, and homeland security communities. 
Research into the legal issues that underlie many of the hurdles is also a great 
need. 
An additional area of potential research covers topics not specifically 
addressed in this thesis. Other institutions, which may not be obvious sources of 
potential support, should be examined for their potential needs and contributions. 
For instance, support may be given to correctional facilities to help them turn 
their own assets, such as medical staff, into volunteers. Nursing home and 
assisted living center staff, and even residents, may be potential sources of 
support, once they have attended to their own responsibilities. 
E. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The challenge now being faced by communities across the country is how 
to most effectively and quickly distribute and dispense the medication that will be 
desperately needed during a biological emergency. The current CDC plans and 
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CRI guidelines have made serious advances in supporting the preparedness of 
states and cities; however, they also fall short of meeting the established goals 
and the needs of the American people. Public health and emergency 
management officials need to develop more options that meet the needs of the 
communities and that make use of the resources available to the communities. 
Public health planners must involve the businesses of the communities to make 
success of the mass prophylaxis effort a possibility. 
Four options are presented in this thesis: 
1. Public health officials supported by traditional volunteers, 
2. Delivery and dispensing through the support of the USPS, 
3. Adding the full community support through local businesses, and 
4. The combined option that uses all three of the other options.  
Each option has advantages and shortcomings. The two recommended options 
are Option 1, the current option, and Option 3, the business support option. The 
task is to somehow construct a strategic framework that will draw the best from 
these two options, while mitigating their limiting factors. 
The strategic framework that this analysis produces consists of several 
main features: flexibility in application, agility in response to the needs of the 
community, speed of delivery and dispensing, complete community awareness of 
the effort, and effective use of community assets. Total community engagement, 
involving the business communities in the planning and implementation of the 
response achieves this by broadening the discussion of resources available 
within the community. Greater awareness of the options, their benefits, and 
weaknesses, gives leaders better data to support decisions for response. 
In the end, the expectations and cooperation of the population of the local 
communities will be more important than how much of the stockpile is delivered 
and how fast it is delivered to various dispensing sites. Trust in the plan and in 
those who will be conducting the dispensing operations, and faith in the 
government’s ability to deliver the right amount of medication to the right location, 
require that local residents believe they can count upon their own community to 
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be fully prepared, fully engaged, and fully accountable. Current planning and 
preparation have not yet achieved this level of participation.72 Ultimately, the 
value of engaging local businesses as indemnified partners in planning and 
implementation is directly linked to this local familiarity and trust. 
 
 
                                            
72 During interviews with Mark Palen, Gainesville (Georgia) Health District Emergency 
Coordinator, on February 2, 2007, and with Dr. Alfa Bryan, Cobb-Douglas (Georgia) District 
Health Director, on February14, 2007, both indicated that the Pandemic Influenza County 
Planning Committees were bringing many of the agencies and organizations to the table for 
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